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Return on Data: 
 
Personalizing Consumer Guidance in Data Exchanges 
Noam Kolt* 
Consumers routinely supply personal data to technology companies in 
exchange for services. Yet, the relationship between the utility (U) consumers 
gain and the data (D) they supply — “return on data” (ROD) — remains 
largely unexplored. Expressed as a ratio, ROD = U / D. While lawmakers 
strongly advocate protecting consumer privacy, they tend to overlook ROD. 
Are the benefits of the services enjoyed by consumers, such as social 
networking and predictive search, commensurate with the value of the data 
extracted from them? How can consumers compare competing data-for-
services deals? Currently, the legal frameworks regulating these transactions, 
including privacy law, aim primarily to protect personal data. They treat data 
protection as a standalone issue, distinct from the benefits consumers receive. 
This article, drawing on the emerging field of personalized law, suggests that 
privacy concerns should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of ROD. Just as 
businesses can quantify return on investment (ROI) to optimize investment 
decisions, individual consumers should be able to assess ROD in order to make 
informed decisions on how to spend and invest personal data. Making ROD 
transparent will enable consumers to navigate the range of data-for-services 
deals on offer, evaluate their merits, and negotiate their terms. Pivoting from 
the privacy paradigm to ROD will also incentivize technology companies to 
offer consumers higher ROD, as well as create opportunities for new market 
entrants. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many technology companies do not charge fees for the services they 
provide. They market their services as free.1 But these arrangements can be 
misleading. The business models of Big Tech firms and other service 
providers rely on consumers trading personal data for services. Consumers, 
 
*      Associate, Yigal Arnon & Co. Many thanks to Shaanan Cohney, Adi Deutsch, 
Reza Green, Teddy Lazebnik, and the working group of Monash University 
Law Faculty alumni for reviewing earlier versions of this article. The views 
expressed in this article are the author’s own and should not be attributed to 
any company or organization.  
1. See, e.g., Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2018/04/10/transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-hearing 
[https://perma.cc/84SQ-9C4M] [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (“There will 
always be a version of Facebook that is free.”); see also Zuckerberg’s 
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in effect, pay for services with personal data.2 The bargain is data for 
services. Although lawmakers have addressed the erosion of privacy, they 
have not directly confronted this bargain, which is now at the core of the 
increasingly post-privacy economy.3 Privacy and data protection continue 
to monopolize the debate. Change is overdue. We must begin to explore the 
notion of return on data (ROD)—the relationship between the price 
consumers pay, in the form of personal data, and the utility of the services they 
receive. 
Skepticism around the prevailing privacy paradigm is growing. Brittany 
Kaiser, former Business Development Director at Cambridge Analytica, 
provocatively declared that “[p]rivacy just isn’t possible in the post-
Facebook crisis era . . . . Just like with Airbnb – if somebody is going to come 
and use your physical assets, you would expect to agree [on] a price and 
what they’re going to do with it before you hand over the keys to your 
house . . . . Why isn’t it the same with your data?”4 Kaiser’s remarks are 
revealing. Apart from implying that we can no longer adequately protect 
 
2. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR 
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 1, 47 (2015); MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. 
GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY § 1.26 (2016); Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying 
for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1420 
(2017) [hereinafter Paying for Privacy]; see, e.g., Mary Madden, Need Medical 
Help? Sorry, Not Until You Sign Away Your Privacy, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 23, 
2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612282/need-medical-help-
sorry-not-until-you-sign-away-your-privacy [https://perma.cc/CC4U-P4VK]; 
Rachel Metz, Google’s New Tools Will Make Your Life More Convenient—For a 
Price, MIT TECH. REV. (May 7, 2018), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611079/googles-new-tools-will-
make-your-life-more-convenientfor-a-price [https://perma.cc/LAR4-4LHR]; 
Jason T. Voiovich, Using Google Maps Costs More than You Think, MEDIUM (Dec. 
17, 2018), https://medium.com/swlh/using-google-maps-costs-more-than-
you-think-d62c7d857b2d [https://perma.cc/2PK6-YNYW]. 
3. See ANDREAS S. WEIGEND, DATA FOR THE PEOPLE: HOW TO MAKE OUR POST-PRIVACY 
ECONOMY WORK FOR YOU 969 (2017); The End of Privacy (Special Issue), 347 
SCIENCE 490 (2015). 
4. Michelle Jamrisko & Mark Miller, If Privacy Is Dead, Some Argue People Should 
Sell Their Own Data, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-06/if-privacy-is-
dead-some-argue-people-should-sell-their-own-data 
[https://perma.cc/346L-57LU]. See generally BRITTANY KAISER, TARGETED: THE 
CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA WHISTLEBLOWER’S INSIDE STORY OF HOW BIG DATA, TRUMP, 
AND FACEBOOK BROKE DEMOCRACY AND HOW IT CAN HAPPEN AGAIN (2019). 
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personal data, she asserts that we must scrutinize what consumers receive 
in return for the data they supply. 
Lawmakers are also beginning to recognize the limitations of the 
privacy paradigm. In the 2018 Senate hearing before which Facebook CEO 
Mark Zuckerberg testified, Commerce Committee Chairman John Thune 
remarked that “whether you are using Facebook or Google or some other 
online services, we are trading certain information about ourselves for free 
or low-cost services.” Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley stated 
that “[a]s we get more free or extremely low-cost services, the trade-off for 
the American consumer is to provide more personal data.”5 Tellingly, even 
Facebook’s own homepage no longer states that its services are “free.”6 
Despite growing recognition of data-for-services transactions, several 
important questions have been ignored. What is the precise data price that 
consumers pay for a given service? Do all consumers pay the same data 
price for a given service? What exactly do consumers receive in return for 
the data they supply? Do all consumers enjoy the same benefits in exchange 
for sharing the equivalent quantity and quality of personal data? Which 
service providers offer consumers the best deals? Without a clear 
conceptual framework and personalized, granular insight into data-for-
services transactions, it is difficult to answer these questions. At present, 
individual consumers cannot assess precisely how much personal data they 
pay for the services they receive. Nor can they assess the specific utility they 
gain in return for the data they supply. The ROD of these deals—the 
relationship between the data price consumers pay and the benefits they 
receive—is unknown. 
To date, there are no legal frameworks that regulate ROD or data 
platforms that evaluate ROD. Existing legal frameworks and data platforms 
tend to focus overwhelmingly on privacy. The chief response to the many 
privacy scandals embroiling Big Tech has been to demand greater 
protection for personal data.7 Although privacy laws in the United States 
 
5. Senate Hearing, supra note 1. 
6. Joshua Bote, Facebook Tweaks Homepage, No Longer Says It Is ‘Free and Always 




7. See Angela Chen, Why San Francisco’s Ban on Face Recognition Is Only the Start 
of a Long Fight, MIT TECH. REV. (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613536/facial-recognition-ban-san-
francisco-surveillance-privacy-private-corporate-interests 
[https://perma.cc/VL69-8X8V]; Jessica Rich, Beyond Facebook: It’s High Time 
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and in the EU have significantly developed in recent years,8 they too focus 
on data protection. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
which came into effect in 2018, and California’s Consumer Privacy Act 
(CCPA), which is due to come into effect in 2020, do not scrutinize the 
benefits that consumers reap from data-for-services transactions or 
investigate how these benefits weigh up against the data price that 
consumers pay. Terms of service and privacy policies, which establish the 
parameters of data-for-services transactions, decouple the collection of 
personal data from the provision of services.9 
Alongside these legal developments, innovations in privacy tech are 
flourishing.10 There are scores of technologies that monitor data collection 
and seek to provide data protection.11 Some companies give consumers the 
option of paying a monetary premium to receive privacy-friendly versions 
of services that would otherwise collect vast amounts of personal data.12 
Privacy is also increasingly being integrated into the design of consumer 
products and services.13 With few exceptions, privacy tech aims only to 
 
for Stronger Privacy Laws, WIRED (Aug. 4, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/beyond-facebook-its-high-time-for-
stronger-privacy-laws [https://perma.cc/C8XH-DKYE]; Zack Whittaker, In 
Senate Hearing, Tech Giants Push Lawmakers for Federal Privacy Rules, 
TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 26, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/26/in-
senate-hearing-tech-giants-push-lawmakers-for-federal-privacy-rules 
[https://perma.cc/KE3C-MAHW]. 
8. See infra Section III.B. 
9. See infra Section III.A. But see infra Section III.D. 
10. See Alyssa Newcomb, At CES, Tech’s Biggest Trade Show, Privacy Was the 
Buzzword, NBC (Jan. 12, 2019), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/ces-tech-s-biggest-trade-show-
privacy-was-buzzword-n957826 [https://perma.cc/R6U5-YUK7]; cf. Pete 
Pachal, CES 2019 Had Nothing to Say about the Biggest Conversation in Tech, 
MASHABLE (Jan. 12, 2019), https://mashable.com/article/ces-2019-
consumer-data-privacy/#T8CftbcriaqM [https://perma.cc/LQ9E-2QCA]. 
11. See infra Section IV.A. 
12. See infra Section IV.B. 
13. See, e.g., Tripp Mickle, Apple Exerts Power as Privacy Protector, WALL ST. J. (Jan 
31., 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-exerts-power-as-privacy-
protector-11548982840 [https://perma.cc/W3GR-K3RJ]; Blake Morgan, 
Apple Flaunts Privacy at CES: Why Other Companies Should Pay Attention, 
FORBES (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/blakemorgan/2019/01/07/apple-flaunts-
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protect personal data.14 It does not attempt to assess what consumers 
receive in exchange for the personal data they supply. 
Although data protection and privacy are vital and understandably fuel 
much of the “techlash” against data-driven companies, they are not the only 
issues confronting the data economy. Regulators and developers seeking to 
tackle the collection, use, and trade of personal data largely overlook the 
benefits consumers receive in exchange for the personal data they share. 
Privacy law, privacy policies, and privacy tech are partly to blame. By 
emphasizing data protection, they obscure the exchange that underpins the 
predominant business model of most major tech firms. To properly grapple 
with data-for-services transactions, we need to pivot away from the 
prevailing privacy paradigm and build a feasible alternative.15 
The goal of ROD is to make data-for-services transactions more 
transparent and guide consumers as they navigate the offerings of different 
service providers. Equipped with this choice engine, consumers will be able 
to optimize their decisions on how to spend and invest personal data. The 
implications of ROD are far-reaching. If consumers begin to select services 
even partly on the basis of ROD, service providers will have an incentive to 
pay close attention to ROD. In order to compete with companies providing 
comparable services, they will need to increase consumers’ ROD, either by 
reducing the data price or providing additional benefits to consumers. In 
this way, ROD would bolster competition between tech firms, stimulate 
innovation, and, ultimately, offer consumers more favorable data-for-
services deals. 
This Article begins by revealing the shortcomings of the privacy 
paradigm, before proceeding to consider the advantages of ROD and explore 
how ROD can be implemented in practice. Section II critically examines the 
phenomenon of data-for-services transactions. Aided by behavioral 
insights, it questions our preoccupation with privacy and advocates a 
transition to ROD. Section III considers the legal frameworks that regulate 
data-for-services transactions and depicts how these frameworks largely 
fail to address the underlying exchanges between consumers and service 




14. See infra Section IV.C. 
15. To be sure, the author does not deny that the right to privacy is of paramount 
importance. Rather, the emphasis in this Article is that privacy is only one 
aspect of data-for-services deals and that at present these deals are not 
scrutinized holistically, but only in terms of their impact on privacy. 
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personal data or provide benefits in exchange for personal data but do not 
make data-for-services transactions transparent. Section V outlines the 
steps required to implement ROD: (A) establishing a conceptual roadmap 
for evaluating ROD, (B) developing personalized tools to engage consumers, 
and (C) exploring regulatory and other pathways to adopting ROD. It 
concludes that ROD has the potential both to empower individual 
consumers and to incentivize companies to carefully consider the 
relationship between the personal data they collect and the services they 
provide. 
II. PIVOTING FROM PRIVACY TO RETURN ON DATA 
A. Exchanging Personal Data for Services 
Finja, a digital payments company, does not charge consumers 
transaction fees. Instead, it relies on selling consumers value-added 
services, such as credit and insurance, which it can effectively market with 
the assistance of data-driven technologies.16 According to Finja’s CEO, the 
real price consumers pay is personal data.17 This business model extends 
beyond fintech. Consumers in many contexts regularly use services 
provided by firms that collect personal data. These services often incur no 
monetary charge.18 Consumers receive services in return for enabling 
service providers to collect personal data. These exchanges are a form of 
barter, a quid pro quo.19 
Data-for-services transactions are usually mutually beneficial. The 
collection of data is not an externality imposed on consumers, a hidden cost 
 
16. FINJA, http://finja.pk/Index [https://perma.cc/DB7X-MCAN]. 
17. Money Talks: Don’t Bank with Me Argentina, ECONOMIST (May 8, 2018), 
https://soundcloud.com/theeconomist/money-talks-dont-bank-with-me 
[https://perma.cc/TM9Q-STRP]. 
18. See also infra Section V.A (considering the role of monetary payments 
alongside data payments). But see, e.g., Elvy, supra note 2, at 1387 (discussing 
freemium models). 
19. See JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? 51 (2013); Omer Tene & Jules 
Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics , 
11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 255 (2013); Jacob M. Victor, Comment, The 
EU General Data Protection Regulation: Toward a Property Regime for 
Protecting Data Privacy, 123 YALE L.J. 513, 517 (2013). 
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they must bear in order to receive nominally “free” services.20 Data 
collection is simply the price of the services.21 Conversely, service providers 
do not receive personal data at no cost.22 They provide services in return for 
personal data. Data-for-services transactions are exchanges that deliver 
value to both parties. Consumers access personalized newsfeeds, real-time 
traffic updates, and other valuable services. Meanwhile, companies collect 
personal data that enable them to glean consumer preferences and perform 
targeted advertising.23 Personal data can also help companies train artificial 
intelligence systems,24 as well as perform A/B tests and other product 
analytics.25 Importantly, payment—in the form of data collection—is not a 
one-off event. Nor is it comprised of several distinct installments, as is 
 
20. Cf. CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: THE FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE 18–20 (2009) 
(describing data-driven advertising revenue as a form of cross-subsidy); Chris 
Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s 
Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 609, 649 (2014) (treating data 
collection as an unforeseen transaction cost). 
21. But see infra note 164 (discussing objections to commodifying personal data). 
22. But see ERIC POSNER & GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 234 (2018); The Digital Proletariat: Should 
Internet Firms Pay for the Data Users Currently Give Away?, ECONOMIST (Jan. 11, 
2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-
economics/2018/01/11/should-internet-firms-pay-for-the-data-users-
currently-give-away [https://perma.cc/N9QR-N69K] (describing data-driven 
service providers as free-riders); LANIER, supra note 19, at 49 (arguing that 
“siren servers” do not pay for the data they collect). 
23. See generally David S. Evans, The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, 
Evolution, and Privacy, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 37 (2009). Some companies provide 
or sell data to other firms which then perform targeted advertising. See, e.g., 
Gabriel J.X. Dance et al., As Facebook Raised a Privacy Wall, It Carved an 
Opening for Tech Giants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/technology/facebook-privacy.html 
[https://perma.cc/C63Q-XY4U]; Ava Kofman, Google’s Sidewalk Labs Plans to 
Package and Sell Location Data on Millions of Cellphones, INTERCEPT (Jan. 28, 
2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/01/28/google-alphabet-sidewalk-
labs-replica-cellphone-data [https://perma.cc/PQ2S-Y7FE]. 
24. Imanol Arrieta-Ibarra et al., Should We Treat Data as Labor? Moving Beyond 
“Free”, 108 AM. ECON. ASSOC. PAPERS & PROC. 38, 40–41 (2018). 
25. See, e.g., Ya Xu et al., From Infrastructure to Culture: A/B Testing Challenges in 
Large Scale Social Networks, 21 PROC. ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY'S (ACM) 
SPECIAL INT. GROUP ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING INT’L CONF. ON 
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 2227 (2015). 
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common in retail transactions. Rather, payment is continuous.26 In return 
for providing continuous access to certain services, service providers can 
capture personal data on an ongoing basis. 
For many companies, the data-for-services business model is highly 
lucrative. A majority of the ten largest companies globally—namely 
Alphabet, Amazon, Tencent, Alibaba and Facebook and, increasingly, Apple 
and Microsoft—are, to varying degrees, data-driven.27 Facebook, for 
example, does not charge users a monetary fee. Instead, it collects personal 
data that users generate and uses these to power a targeted advertising 
platform.28 From the consumers’ perspective, the deal is data-for-services. 
In the case of Facebook, over two billion people accept this deal.29 Similarly, 
Google does not charge users a monetary fee for many of the services it 
offers, including Google Search, Gmail, and Google Drive. Instead, Google 
collects personal data that users generate and uses these for a variety of 
purposes.30 Billions of people, in practice, embrace this deal.31 
 
26. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market’s Consumer 
Preference Disconnect, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 131, 150 (2013). 
27. See Global Top 100 Companies by Market Capitalisation, PWC (Mar. 31, 2018), 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/audit-services/assets/pdf/global-top-100-
companies-2018-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ALX-S72H]. 
28. See How the Big Five Tech Companies Make Their Money, Visualized, DIGG (Apr. 
1, 2019), http://digg.com/2019/tech-companies-main-revenue-stream-
data-visualization [https://perma.cc/B4FQ-X76T] (indicating that over 98.5 
percent of Facebook’s revenue is generated by advertising). 
29. See Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 3rd Quarter 2018, 
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-
active-facebook-users-worldwide [https://perma.cc/E7YE-HLZD]. 
30. But see Alexandra Simon-Lewis, Google Will No Longer Read Your Emails to 
Personalise Adverts, WIRED UK (June 26, 2017), 
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/google-reading-personal-emails-privacy 
[https://perma.cc/MVJ5-PLH5]. 
31. See Frederic Lardinois, Gmail Now Has More Than 1B Monthly Active Users, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 1, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/02/01/gmail-
now-has-more-than-1b-monthly-active-users [https://perma.cc/TGV7-
GGH7]; Frederic Lardinois, Google Drive Will Hit a Billion User This Week, 
TECHCRUNCH (July 25, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/25/google-
drive-will-hit-a-billion-users-this-week [https://perma.cc/58EY-8Q5T]. But 
see infra Section III.A (challenging the notion of consumer consent to such 
transactions). 
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But Google and Facebook are not alone. Data-for-services transactions 
are ubiquitous.32 Many companies now have an intimate portrait of their 
customers’ lives and the lives of the people with whom they interact.33 
Amazon, Netflix, Spotify, and other tech firms use personal data to generate 
personalized product recommendations.34 As companies apply data-driven 
business models to new industries and as the Internet of Things (IoT) 
expands into new domains, such as autonomous vehicles and wearable tech, 
data-for-services transactions are likely to surge.35 
Despite privacy concerns, consumers have not, on average, reduced 
their consumption of services paid for with personal data.36 Predictions that 
 
32. Even government bodies, at times, enter into such transactions. See, e.g., Nick 
Wingfield, How Amazon Benefits from Losing Cities’ HQ2 Bids, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/technology/side-
benefit-to-amazons-headquarters-contest-local-expertise.html 
[https://perma.cc/AZA4-8PZX] (discussing how municipalities supplied 
Amazon with vast quantities of data in exchange for the opportunity to bid to 
host the company’s new headquarters). 
33. See, e.g., Youyou Wu et al., Computer-Based Personality Judgments Are More 
Accurate than Those Made by Humans, 112 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 1036 (2015); 
Rory Cellan-Jones, Facebook Explored Unpicking Personalities to Target Ads, 
BBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
43869911 [https://perma.cc/8F4L-X6BH]. 
34. Joeran Beel & Siddharth Dinesh, Real-World Recommender Systems for 
Academia: The Pain and Gain in Building, Operating, and Researching Them, 5 
PROC. WORKSHOP ON BIBLIOMETRIC-ENHANCED INFO. RETRIEVAL 6 (2017). 
35. See, e.g., Melanie Evans & Laura Stevens, Big Tech Expands Footprint in Health, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-starts-
selling-software-to-mine-patient-health-records-1543352136 
[https://perma.cc/E2D6-L2BP]; Emily Glazer et al., Facebook to Banks: Give 
Us Your Data, We’ll Give You Our Users, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-to-banks-give-us-your-data-well-
give-you-our-users-1533564049 [https://perma.cc/F9U5-63D3]; James 
Vlahos, Smart Talking: Are Our Devices Threatening Our Privacy?, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 26, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/mar/26/smart-talking-
are-our-devices-threatening-our-privacy [https://perma.cc/K49Y-MCZF]; 
see also BRUCE SCHNEIER, CLICK HERE TO KILL EVERYBODY: SECURITY AND SURVIVAL IN 
A HYPER-CONNECTED WORLD (2018); Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer 
Data in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 427 (2018). 
36. See, e.g., Nathalie Nahai & Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, What Would You Pay to 
Keep Your Digital Footprint 100% Private?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 12, 2017), 
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privacy breaches would discourage individuals from sharing personal data 
have proven false. According to a Deloitte survey, while 81% of U.S. 
respondents felt that they had lost control over the handling of personal 
data relating to them, individuals’ willingness to share personal data via 
social media has doubled in recent years.37 These figures appear to suggest 
that consumers are content with data-for-services deals.38 
However, not all consumers are fully aware of the scope of the data 
collection that companies are carrying out or how they are using personal 
data. As a result, consumers may not realize the data price that they pay for 
the services they consume.39 For example, few consumers understand the 
depth of insight that companies can glean from location-tracking technology 
on mobile devices.40 In addition, consumers find it difficult to fully 




37. Gina Pingitore et al., To Share or Not to Share: What Consumers Really Think 




38. See Lee Rainie & Maeve Duggan, Privacy and Information Sharing, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/01/14/privacy-and-
information-sharing  [https://perma.cc/494E-QV6F] (demonstrating that, in 
the context of social media platforms, consumers have a strong preference for 
services which do not incur a monetary fee). One respondent explained that 
“I voluntarily use a service in return for giving up some information. For 
example, I use Gmail for free, but I know that Google will capture some 
information in return. I’m fine with that.” Id.; see also Jessi Hempel, The 
Zuckerberg Hearings Were Silicon Valley’s Ultimate Debut, WIRED (Apr. 16, 
2018), https://www.wired.com/story/the-zuckerberg-hearings-were-
silicon-valleys-ultimate-debut [https://perma.cc/9YT2-QN8A] (asserting 
that former Microsoft Director of Search, Stefan Weitz, believes most 
consumers find personal data trade-offs worthwhile). 
39. See Strandburg, supra note 26, at 131 (attributing this to, inter alia, unknown 
and potential future uses or misuses of the data collected); see also id. at 134–
48 (discussing the ramifications of imperfect information). 
40. See Richard Harris, Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They’re 
Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-
data-privacy-apps.html [https://perma.cc/JC98-5J8Y]. 
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no clear monetary price on data.41 The value of data is usually determined 
only after the data are collected and processed.42 Furthermore, crude 
statistics describing consumers’ “willingness to share personal data” 
obscure consumers’ subtle preferences vis-à-vis personal data.43 Various 
factors affect consumer behavior in this domain, including privacy attitudes, 
technical experience, and the specific type of data collection and use.44 
Consumers may also be influenced by companies that market their 
services as free where the price is non-monetary.45 For example, Facebook’s 
homepage stated for over a decade that Facebook is “free and always will 
be,” suggesting that use of its platform was completely free of charge.46 
Some commentators appear to accept this questionable view.47 Today, 
many consumers, including those who are cognizant of the scope and value 
of data collection, do not conceive of their relationships with data-driven 
companies as transactional. They do not experience the collection of 
personal data as a price; that companies may benefit from the data they 
collect is, for them, either irrelevant or inevitable.48 Consumers tend to 
 
41. See infra Section II.A at 90–91 (regarding attempts to assess the value of 
personal data). 
42. Id. 
43. See, e.g., Yaxing Yao, Folk Models of Online Behavioral Advertising, 2017 PROC. 
ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK & SOC. COMPUTING 1957. 
44. See Farah Chanchary & Sonia Chiasson, User Perceptions of Sharing, 
Advertising, and Tracking, 2015 PROC. SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
(SOUPS) 53, 61–62; Sonia Chiasson, Privacy Concerns Amidst OBA and the Need 
for Alternative Models, 22 INT. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC ENGINEERS (IEEE) 
INTERNET COMPUTING 52 (2018); see also Pedro Giovanni Leon et al., What 
Matters to Users? Factors that Affect Users’ Willingness to Share Information 
with Online Advertisers, 2013 PROC. SOUPS 1, 5–8. 
45. See Opinion on the Proposal for a Directive on Certain Aspects Concerning 
Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION 
SUPERVISOR (EDPS) 7 (Mar. 14, 2017), 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/17-03-
14_opinion_digital_content_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/QVQ3-NYGG]. 
46. See Bote, supra note 6. 
47. See ANDERSON, supra note 20, at 9; see also id. at 24 (regarding data labor). But 
see id. at 18–20 (regarding the role of advertising). For a critique, see John M. 
Newman, The Myth of Free, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 513, 524–35 (2018), which 
argues that the marginal costs of data-driven service providers are not 
negligible. 
48. See Rainie & Duggan, supra note 38. 
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believe that attempts to limit companies’ data collection and analysis are 
futile. Consumers supply personal data out of resignation, not on the basis 
of a cost-benefit analysis.49 
Denying that the relationships between data-driven firms and 
consumers are transactional is problematic for several reasons. To begin 
with, privacy matters to many consumers.50 For these people, parting with 
personal data is paying a price. More broadly, these transactions are an 
exchange. They involve trading one valuable resource for another.51 In data-
for-services deals, irrespective of whether consumers perceive of data as 
valuable or subjectively experience a disutility or cost, consumers do give 
away something valuable (personal data) and, in exchange, receive valuable 
services.52 This is the definition of barter: the exchange of one valuable 
resource for another without money changing hands. 
 
49. See Joseph Turow, The Tradeoff Fallacy, How Marketers Are Misrepresenting 
American Consumers and Opening Them up to Exploitation, ANNENBERG SCH. FOR 
COMM., U. PENN. 1, 3–4 (2015), 
https://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/TradeoffFallacy_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P7MD-K4B5]; see also Joseph Turow, Americans and 
Marketplace Privacy: Seven Annenberg National Surveys in Perspective, in 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 151 (Jules Polonetsky et al. eds., 
2018) [hereinafter PRIVACY HANDBOOK]. 
50. Alessandro Acquisti et al., The Economics of Privacy, 54 J. ECON. LIT. 442, 447 
(2016) (describing the psychological discomfort of revealing personal 
information, including in exchange for other benefits). 
51. See GLENN REYNOLDS, ARMY OF DAVIDS: HOW MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY EMPOWER 
ORDINARY PEOPLE TO BEAT BIG MEDIA, BIG GOVERNMENT, AND OTHER GOLIATHS 158–
59 (2007) (describing value as connoting an object’s ability to be exchanged 
for another object). 
52. See Fuel of the Future: Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy, ECONOMIST (May 
6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/05/06/data-is-giving-
rise-to-a-new-economy [https://perma.cc/FV89-5VJR]; The World’s Most 
Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, But Data, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-
valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data [https://perma.cc/6BSS-QSKG]; 
cf. Lauren Henry Scholz, Big Data Is Not Big Oil: The Role of Analogy in the Law 
of New Technologies, 86 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); Bernard Marr, 
Here’s Why Data Is Not the New Oil, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/03/05/heres-why-data-
is-not-the-new-oil/#14e256ee3aa9 [https://perma.cc/498L-ZFEG]; Antonio 
Garcia Martinez, No, Data Is Not the New Oil, WIRED (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.wired.com/story/no-data-is-not-the-new-oil 
[https://perma.cc/XF27-9UV9]; Adam Schlosser, You May Have Heard Data Is 
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Admittedly, although data are valuable, it can be difficult to assign them 
a precise monetary price,53 particularly because data are not fungible.54 Nor 
do data have an intrinsic value. The value of data, like that of many other 
resources, is not predetermined or fixed, but a function of supply and 
demand.55 It derives from organizations’ willingness to collect or purchase 
 
the New Oil. It’s Not, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/data-is-not-the-new-oil 
[https://perma.cc/CWU9-4EGM]. 
53. See LANIER, supra note 19, at 360. There have been many attempts to assess 
the value of personal data. See, e.g., Ron Hirschprung et al., A Methodology for 
Estimating the Value of Privacy in Information Disclosure Systems, 61 COMPUT. 
HUM. BEHAV. 443 (2016); Angela G. Winegar & Cass R. Sunstein, How Much Is 
Data Privacy Worth? A Preliminary Investigation, 42 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 
(forthcoming 2019); Jay R. Corrigan et al., How Much Is Social Media Worth? 
Estimating the Value of Facebook by Paying Users to Stop Using It, PLOS ONE 
(Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.020710
1 [https://perma.cc/R2YZ-YDGE] (using experimental auctions to discover 
the monetary value which users place on Facebook’s services); Arslan Aziz & 
Rahul Telang, What Is a Digital Cookie Worth? (Apr. 14, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2757325 [https://perma.cc/EG66-2XQE]. 
54. See Paul Sonderegger, The Rise of Data Capital, FORBES 1, 4–5 (Feb. 24, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/oracle/2015/02/24/the-rise-of-data-
capital/#54aac7a87c0c [https://perma.cc/2GRB-L92J] (arguing that data are 
non-fungible and non-rivalrous but recognizing that the value of particular 
data decreases as they become more widely disseminated). Privacy, by 
contrast, is a rivalrous good or right. See Rise of Data Capital, ORACLE–MIT 
TECH. REV. 1, 2–3 (2016), 
http://files.technologyreview.com/whitepapers/MIT_Oracle+Report-
The_Rise_of_Data_Capital.pdf [https://perma.cc/UL9V-9YVW] (describing 
data as a scarce resource). In addition, although the supply of data is arguably 
infinite—there being no limit on the information which can be generated and 
recorded—the attention (or “mindshare”) of prospective customers and their 
spending power are scarce. See THOMAS H. DAVENPORT, THE ATTENTION ECONOMY: 
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW CURRENCY OF BUSINESS (2002); TIM WU, THE ATTENTION 
MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE OUR HEADS (2016). 
55. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1 (9th ed. 2014) 
(explaining that the law of demand does not apply only to goods with explicit 
prices and that, fundamentally, economics is about claims over scarce 
resources, not money per se). As to the issue that no specific data are supplied 
or that the data to be supplied do not presently exist, arguably what the 
consumer supplies is future, ongoing access to certain data. See infra Section 
II.C. 
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data, which itself fluctuates over time depending on the utility of the data to 
the organization, and individuals’ willingness to supply data.56 However, 
personal data are perhaps different in an important way from many other 
valuable resources. The value of data typically materializes only after firms 
that can aggregate and monetize them choose to do so.57 Privacy interests 
aside, data are less valuable when in the hands of consumers, who are 
generally unable to monetize data. 
Yet, it is problematic to suggest that, because the value of data only 
materializes later (once monetized by data collectors or aggregators), 
consumers do not pay a price by sharing data with service providers. Such 
a suggestion falsely assumes that a price is paid only where payment is 
either (i) valuable prior to its being made or (ii) valuable to the payer. This 
assumption is not always correct. Value is often context-dependent and 
time-sensitive.58 The value of a resource can change from place to place and 
from person to person. It can ripen or deteriorate with time. A raw material 
may be far more valuable to a company that can process or use it to 
manufacture other products than to the person who initially discovers or 
extracts it. Nevertheless, exchanging the raw material for a different 
resource or asset constitutes payment. The same is true of data-for-services 
exchanges. Data, like raw materials, are a valuable commodity.59 Their value 
is context-dependent and time-sensitive. Exchanging data for services—
irrespective of whether consumers subjectively experience a price or 
disutility—involves a give-and-take of valuable resources. Sharing personal 
data is, therefore, a form of payment. 
 
56. See id. at § 1.2; see also Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 20, at 610. 
57. See, e.g., WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 344–48; Elvy, supra note 2, at 1420. For data 
aggregators, the marginal value of personal data relating to a particular 
individual is usually insignificant. See POSNER & WEYL, supra note 22, at 225 
(citing Google Chief Economist, Hal Varian). 
58. See Gianclaudio Malgieri & Bart Custers, Pricing Privacy—The Right to Know 
the Value of Your Personal Data, 34 COMPUT. L. & SECURITY REV. 289, 294 (2018). 
59. See Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal Construction of 
the Surveillance Economy, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 213 (2018) (characterizing data as 
a raw material). But others characterize data as labor. See, e.g., POSNER & WEYL, 
supra note 22, at 208–09; Arrieta-Ibarra et al., supra note 24, at 38–39, 41; see 
also ANDERSON, supra note 20, at 24; TREBOR SCHOLZ, DIGITAL LABOR: THE INTERNET 
AS PLAYGROUND AND FACTORY 15, 52–53, 151 (2013); ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD 
WAVE 11 (1980) (coining the term “prosumer”); Chris Marsden, Prosumer Law 
and Network Platform Regulation: The Long View Towards Creating Offdata, 
GEO. L. TECH. REV. 376, 377 (2018); Tiziana Terranova, Free Labor: Producing 
Culture for the Digital Economy, 18 SOCIAL TEXT 33 (2000). 
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We can, however, question whether data-for-services exchanges are 
bilateral transactions—that is, whether they are between only two parties. 
Data are often collected from, and subsequently used by, multiple actors.60 
The inputs into data-driven services are aggregated from many people and 
harnessed by different organizations, regardless of whether people actually 
receive any services from those other organizations.61 Although these 
exchanges may not be strictly bilateral, an individual consumer does indeed 
supply personal data to data-driven companies and, in exchange, receive 
services. 
Yet, this quid pro quo conception of the relationship between consumers 
and service providers has been called into question. In a thought-provoking 
article rejecting the idea that data collection constitutes payment, Katherine 
Strandburg made the following observation: 
The common analogy between online data collection for 
behaviorally targeted advertising and payment for purchases is 
seriously misleading. There is no functioning market based on 
exchanges of personal information for access to online products and 
services. In a functioning market, payment of a given price signals 
consumer demand for particular goods and services, transmitting 
consumer preferences to producers. Data collection would serve as 
“payment” . . . only if its transfer from users to collectors adequately 
signaled user preferences for online goods and services.62 
 
60. See Passive Data Collection, INT’L ASSOC. PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS, 
https://iapp.org/resources/article/passive-data-collection 
[https://perma.cc/V9L7-B2P4]; see also Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/policies/privacy [https://perma.cc/C9RD-YHNE] 
(distinguishing between data “you create or provide to us” and data “we 
collect as you use our services”); Data Policy, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy [https://perma.cc/BQR2-
C47S] (referring to “[t]hings others do and information that they provide 
about you”) (emphasis added). Passive data is also sometimes referred to as 
“ambient data.” See supra note 25 (regarding the transfer and sale of personal 
data). 
61. See Laura Hautala, Shadow Profiles: Facebook Has Information You Didn’t Hand 
Over, CNET (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/shadow-profiles-
facebook-has-information-you-didnt-hand-over [https://perma.cc/M5SS-
46FA]. 
62. Strandburg, supra note 26, at 95 (emphasis added); see also Acquisti et al., 
supra note 50, at 447-48 (explaining that the data markets open to 
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According to Strandburg, for data collection to be considered payment, 
there needs to exist a market in which consumers can actively participate 
and, through the quantity and quality of data they supply, signal their data 
price preferences to service providers. At present, as consumers are often 
unaware of the scope of data collection taking place, they do not experience 
any disutility in sharing personal data with service providers.63 
Consequently, they do not select among competing services based on data 
price. Nor do consumers negotiate the data price or the quality of services. 
Data-for-services deals are usually binary “take it or leave it” offers.64 To 
access the service, the consumer must supply whatever data the service 
provider seeks to collect. To avoid supplying these personal data, the 
consumer must altogether refrain from using the service. It is all or 
nothing.65 For example, to access Netflix, a consumer must consent to 
Netflix’s privacy policy and enable the data collection that it permits.66 
 
infomediaries, such as credit-reporting agencies and advertising companies, 
are closed to consumers). 
63. Strandburg, supra note 26, at 130–31, 147–48 (explaining that consumers are 
unable to calculate the marginal disutility of a given instance of data 
collection); see id. at 107–08 (suggesting that, in the context of advertising-
based business models, data-driven companies do not directly receive 
additional data or value from consumers by offering them better services). 
Strandburg adds that consumers, at best, signal their preferences indirectly, 
through advertisers—the “real” customers of data-driven companies—which 
pay platforms to reach consumers. However, in reality, companies also collect 
consumer data for purposes other than advertising, such as to train AI. As the 
value of data for such purposes is largely independent of advertising revenue, 
in these contexts advertisers’ willingness to pay data-driven companies would 
not serve as a proxy for consumers’ preferences. See POSNER & WEYL, supra 
note 22, at 231–32. 
64. See Maurice E. Stucke, Should We Be Concerned About Dataopolies?, 2 GEO. L. 
TECH. REV. 275, 289 (2018). 
65. See SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 49–50; WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 229–36; 531–
33; 3403–10 (arguing that this environment of “binary choice” should be 
reformed). 
66. Privacy Policy, NETFLIX, https://help.netflix.com/legal/privacy 
[https://perma.cc/E9FY-7MMG]; see also Matthew Gault, Netflix Has Saved 
Every Choice You’ve Ever Made in ‘Black Mirror: Bandersnatch,’ MOTHERBOARD 
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There is no possibility of significantly restricting data collection and, in 
exchange, accessing a stripped-down version of Netflix. Data collection is a 
flat fee that all users must pay irrespective of how they wish to use the 
service. 
Even where consumers can opt out of some data collection, there is 
presently little correlation between the data collection to which consumers 
consent and the quality of the services they receive. For instance, denying a 
mobile app (e.g., a news app) certain data collection permissions will not 
generally affect the service provided. A consumer could receive the very 
same service at a lower data price simply by restricting the data 
permissions. Social networking platforms face a similar issue. Different 
users may spend different amounts of time on a platform and use it in 
different ways. Heavy users may consume and post content on a daily basis. 
Light users may use the platform only occasionally. Clearly, not all users 
reap the same benefits from the platform. Yet, the platform may well subject 
all users to the same scope of data collection, especially if the platform 
collects data from users even while they are not accessing the platform.67 In 
other words, heavy users and light users may well pay the same data price.68 
This lack of alignment between data price and service quality is a moral 
hazard. Service providers can unilaterally vary the data price without 
suffering adverse consequences. They have no incentive to limit the scope 
of data they extract from consumers. Companies can set arbitrary data 
prices and charge consumers as they see fit. 
But some data-for-services transactions are different. Consider, for 
example, location-based friend suggestions, in which a platform makes 
friend suggestions based on the geographic proximity between different 
 
67. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., Responses to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, 197 (June 8, 2018) 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Zuckerberg%20Respons
es%20to%20Commerce%20Committee%20QFRs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MM6N-EMRW] (confirming that Facebook can track 
browsing activity after a user logs off the platform). 
68. See POSNER & WEYL, supra note 22, at 231–32. But, by sharing or consuming 
more content on the platform, heavy users arguably pay a higher data price 
than light users. However, the additional data collected from heavy users may 
pale in comparison to the vast quantities of data passively collected from 
heavy and light users alike. It is also possible that a heavy user may deny the 
platform certain data-collection permissions while a light user may not. In 
such a case, paradoxically, the heavy user would pay a lower data price and 
enjoy greater utility than the light user. 
RETURN ON DATA  
 95 
users.69 This feature is available only to users who enable the platform to 
collect location data. If a user wishes to receive location-based friend 
suggestions, she must allow the platform to collect location data—that is, 
she must pay a higher data price. Here, there is some correlation between 
the data price and the utility. But, then again, not all users who permit the 
collection of location data actually take advantage of location-based friend 
suggestions. Arguably, such users pay an inflated data price as they share 
location data but receive no additional benefit. They, so to speak, leave data 
on the table. 
Strandburg is largely correct in observing that, at present, consumers 
cannot effectively signal their data price preferences to service providers. 
The scope of data collection usually has little impact on the benefits 
consumers receive. The relationship between the “give” and the “take” is 
arbitrary. Contrary to Strandburg’s position, however, the lack of 
correlation between data price and utility does not indicate that consumers 
do not pay for services with personal data. It merely indicates that they do 
so in a failed market.70 The inability of consumers to signal their preferences 
does not undermine the fact that consumers do indeed participate in a 
value-for-value exchange. In fact, recognizing that consumers pay for 
services with personal data is a prerequisite for assessing the merits of data-
for-services transactions. Only if these transactions were more transparent 
would consumers be able to signal their preferences to service providers 
and, ultimately, precipitate a more functional and consumer-friendly 
market. 
 
69. See Privacy Policy, WAZE, https://www.waze.com/en/legal/privacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZU86-B9DM] (indicating that Waze collects additional 
data from users who opt in to the “find friends” feature); see also Amelia Tait, 
Why Does Facebook Recommend Friends I’ve Never Even Met?, WIRED (May 29, 
2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/facebook-people-you-may-know-
friend-suggestions [https://perma.cc/J3UH-7ML9]. 
70. Cf. Caleb S. Fuller, Is the Market for Digital Privacy a Failure?, 180 PUB. CHOICE 
353 (2019). Technically, a market failure refers to an inefficient allocation of 
resources. At present, personal data are not always allocated to the companies 
that are willing to pay the most for them (by providing the best services). In 
addition, given that the scope and value of data collection can change, data-
for-services arrangements may be affected by uncertainty and maladaptation. 
See Jan Whittington & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90 N.C. 
L. REV. 1327, 1333–34, 1342, 1349 (2012). 
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B. Consumer Apathy and Behavioral Biases 
According to the theory of bounded rationality, decision-making is 
constrained by available information and cognitive capacities.71 In the 
context of data-for-services transactions, consumers often lack vital 
information regarding the scope of data collection, the risks it entails, and 
its commercial value.72 Consumers do not have the tools to quantify the 
utility of the services they receive or compare this to the value of the data 
they supply. As a result, data-for-services transactions are opaque. Service 
providers and data collectors typically have far more information than 
consumers. Unlike consumers, tech firms are acutely aware of the scope of 
collection, use, and value of personal data. This information asymmetry 
places consumers and companies in radically different bargaining 
positions.73 Tech firms can dictate to consumers the terms of data-for-
services transactions. 
The fact that many companies do not charge fees for the services they 
provide exacerbates this situation. The “free” price tag is a powerful 
marketing tactic that implies that no price whatsoever is extracted from 
consumers.74 It entices consumers to blindly accept each and every data-
 
71. See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: EMPIRICALLY 
GROUNDED ECONOMIC REASON (1982); HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN, SOCIAL 
AND RATIONAL: MATHEMATICAL ESSAYS ON RATIONAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL 
SETTING (1957). 
72. See Alessandro Acquisti et al., Nudges for Privacy and Security: Understanding 
and Assisting Users’ Choices Online, 50 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS, no. 3, 2017, at 
44:1, 44:4. 
73. See SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 195; Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management 
and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1883–86 (2013). See 
generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). There also exists a collective 
action problem. While a tech firm can reap enormous benefits from personal 
data collected and aggregated en masse, the individual consumer does not 
typically experience any disutility in supplying personal data and will 
therefore have little incentive to demand more favorable data-for-services 
deals. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
74. See David Adam Friedman, Free Offers: A New Look, 38 N.M. L. REV. 49, 68–69 
(2008); Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 20, at 635, 648; Kristina 
Shampanier et al., Zero as a Special Price: The True Value of Free Products, 26 
MARKETING SCI. 742, 753–54 (2007); see also Josh Kopelman, The Penny Gap, 
REDEYE VC (Mar. 10, 2007), 
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for-services deal.75 Moreover, where the price of services is non-monetary, 
consumers do not experience the so-called “pain of paying.”76 As a result, 
they overlook the data price they pay.77 By altogether refraining from 
engaging in a cost-benefit analysis, consumers tend to overvalue the 
services they receive.78 
Consumer behavior in this context can be explained by specific 




75. See Natali Helberger et al., The Perfect Match? A Closer Look at the Relationship 
between EU Consumer Law and Data Protection Law, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
1427, 1442–44 (2017) (suggesting that portraying a product as free where it 
is paid for with personal data may be considered misleading under EU 
consumer law). 
76. See Dan Ariely, The Pain of Paying, DAN ARIELY (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://danariely.com/2013/02/05/the-pain-of-paying; see also Drazen 
Prelec & George Loewenstein, The Red and the Black: Mental Accounting of 
Savings and Debt, 17 MARKETING SCI. 4 (1998). But see Nina Mazar et al., Pain of 
Paying?—A Metaphor Gone Literal: Evidence from Neural and Behavioral 
Science (Rotman Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2901808, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2901808 
[https://perma.cc/J3P7-ADDG]. 
77. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 24 (2011) (explaining that 
people tend to be blind to the obvious and to their blindness). But see Teppo 
Felin, The Fallacy of Obviousness, AEON (July 5, 2018), 
https://aeon.co/essays/are-humans-really-blind-to-the-gorilla-on-the-
basketball-court [https://perma.cc/M8ZL-ECCL] (positing that such 
blindness is a feature, not a bug). Accordingly, such blindness may actually 
allow people to enjoy digital services in a more carefree manner. See also 
Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 
183, 192 (1999) (regarding payment decoupling); Dan Ariely, supra note 76 
(suggesting that consumers sometimes take steps to reduce their pain of 
paying in order to enjoy certain goods and services guilt-free, such as booking 
all-inclusive holiday packages). 
78. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS 54–65 (2008). 
79. See Acquisti et al., supra note 72, at 27-31; see also Solove, supra note 73, at 
1886–88. But see Fuller, supra note 70 (questioning some of these findings). 
See generally RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING (2016); Richard Thaler, Toward 
a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980) 
(harnessing the findings of Kahneman and Tversky to demonstrate that, 
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Although studies by economists and psychologists focused specifically on 
privacy, their findings can be harnessed to shine light on data-for-services 
transactions more generally. The main findings are as follows: 
Framing effects — As the benefits (services) consumers receive are 
communicated upfront, while the costs (data collection) are not, consumers 
tend to have an overly positive perception of data-for-services 
transactions.80 They contemplate the utility they gain but neglect the 
personal data they supply. 
Hyperbolic discounting — Data-for-services transactions are structured 
as “buy now, pay later” offers.81 The short-term or immediate benefits of, 
for example, a social media experience can divert consumers’ attention 
away from the longer-term costs of sharing personal data.82 
Loss aversion — The more consumers feel in control of personal data, 
the more they value them.83 Hence, in data-for-services transactions, where 
consumers do not feel in control of the personal data they supply, they 
usually undervalue those data. 
Availability heuristic — Consumers find it difficult to tangibly envisage 
or fully understand the costs associated with data-for-services transactions, 
such as downstream data security risks, and consequently ignore them.84 
 
contrary to rational choice theory, individuals are not consistent or effective 
utility-maximizers and instead make systemic errors in decision making). 
80. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and 
the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981). 
81. See Strandburg, supra note 26, at 150; Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 
20, at 649. 
82. See Creepy or Cool? Staying on the Right Side of the Consumer Privacy Line, 
KPMG 20 (2016), 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2016/11/creepy-or-
cool.pdf [https://perma.cc/6476-6CLV] (discussing, in addition, the status 
quo, framing, overconfidence and optimism biases). 
83. See Alessandro Acquisti et al., What Is Privacy Worth?, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 
(2013); Jens Grossklags & Alessandro Acquisti, When 25 Cents Is Too Much: An 
Experiment on Willingness-To-Sell and Willingness-To-Protect Personal 
Information, 6 PROC. WORKSHOP ON ECON. INFO. SECURITY 1 (2007); see also Daniel 
Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase 
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Thaler, supra note 79, at 43 (coining 
the term “endowment effect”). 
84. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127 (1974) (describing the bias of 
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Status quo bias — As with other transactions, consumers are inclined to 
accept the status quo and default choices with respect to personal data. 
They do not question or negotiate the deals that tech firms offer them or 
make counter-offers.85 
Herd mentality — Consumers usually conform to the choices of other 
consumers, rather than make individual decisions.86 Different consumers 
tend to purchase similar services and strike similar data-for-services deals. 
These biases help explain consumers’ apathy with respect to the data 
prices they pay. However, to date, researchers have conspicuously failed to 
apply a key behavioral insight to these decisions. According to Richard 
Thaler, in every transaction consumers can gain two different types of 
utility: acquisition utility and transaction utility.87 The former concerns the 
value of a product or service relative to its price; the latter concerns the 
perceived merits of a deal—that is, the price paid for a product or service 
relative to its reference price (i.e., what one would expect to pay for it). In 
Thaler’s classic experiment from the early 1980s, the individuals surveyed 
were, on average, willing to pay far more for a beer in a fancy hotel ($2.65) 
than in a grocery store ($1.50).88 The explanation for this difference is that 
 
imaginability, according to which people overlook dangers that are difficult to 
conceive of or unlikely to come to one’s attention.). 
85. See, e.g., Hana Habib et al., An Empirical Analysis of Website Data Deletion and 
Opt-Out Choices, 2018 PROC. ON ACM COMPUTER HUM. INTERACTION CONF. 
WORKSHOP ON GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE 
HCI COMMUNITY?, https://uploads-
ssl.webflow.com/5a2007a24a11ce000164d272/5ac8833b99758e1fbb1e21
e0_chi-2018-opt.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FPQ-SKWX]; Hana Habib et. al., An 
Empirical Analysis of Data Deletion and Opt-Out Choices on 150 Websites, 15 
PROC. SOUPS 387 (2019), (regarding the usability challenges in privacy choice 
environments). See generally Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in 
Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form 
Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1587–92 (1998). 
86. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 53 (2008); Alessandro Acquisti et al., Privacy 
and Human Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCIENCE 509 (2015) 
(discussing the pressure to conform to the social norms of data sharing). 
87. See Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING 
SCI. 199, 205–10 (1985); Thaler, supra note 77, at 188–89; see also Daniel 
Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, 150 J. INSTITUTIONAL 
& THEORETICAL ECON. 18, 21 (1994) (distinguishing between experienced utility 
and decision utility). 
88. See Thaler, supra note 87. 
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while paying the higher price for a beer is an expected nuisance in the fancy 
hotel (all hotels presumably charge exorbitant prices for beer), it would be 
excessive in the grocery store (where the expected price is far lower). 
The willingness to pay different prices for the same product in different 
contexts suggests that consumers appear to be more concerned by 
transaction utility than acquisition utility.89 They care less about the value 
of a product or service relative to its price and more about the perceived 
merits of the deal—that is, the price paid relative to the reference price, 
which is context-dependent. Even where there are little or no monetary 
savings, consumers tend to attach great importance to the way they 
experience the outcomes of transactions.90 This mental accounting involves 
many psychological factors, including perceptions of fairness.91 
In light of Thaler’s research, one would expect that in data-for-services 
transactions (i) the pursuit of acquisition utility would prompt consumers 
to seek to maximize the utility of the services they receive relative to the 
data price they pay and (ii) the pursuit of transaction utility would prompt 
consumers to compare the data price they pay for a given service to the 
expected or ordinary data price payable for such a service. However, 
consumers do neither of these things. Consumers do not have the tools to 
quantify the utility they receive or the data price they pay and, 
consequently, cannot compare competing data-for-services deals to seek 
out the lowest price and the maximum utility. They cannot scrutinize data-
 
89. Transaction utility perhaps explains the success of businesses’ price-
comparison strategies. See Dhruv Grewal at al., The Effects of Price-Comparison 
Advertising on Buyers’ Perceptions of Acquisition Value, Transaction Value, and 
Behavioral Intentions, 62 J. MARKETING 46 (1998). 
90. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AM. 
PSYCH. 341, 341–42, 348, 349 (1984). But cf. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF 
PRICE (3d ed. 1966) (describing the traditional economic view according to 
which consumers are rational agents and effective utility-maximizers). 
91. See generally GEORGE AKERLOF & ROBERT SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN 
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM ch. 
2 (2009); Peter R. Darke & Darren W. Dahl, Fairness and Discounts: The 
Subjective Value of a Bargain, 13 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 328 (2003); Hyunjoo Im & 
Yong Ha, Is This Mobile Coupon Worth My Private Information? Consumer 
Evaluation of Acquisition and Transaction Utility in a Mobile Coupon Shopping 
Context, 9 J. RES. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 92 (2015); Robert M. Schindler, The 
Excitement of Getting a Bargain: Some Hypotheses Concerning the Origins and 
Effects of Smart-Shopper Feelings, 16 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 447 (1989); 
Lan Xia et al., The Price Is Unfair! A Conceptual Framework of Price Fairness 
Perceptions, 68 J. MARKETING 1 (2004). 
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for-services transactions in the way they scrutinize other transactions. The 
result is that consumers are largely indifferent to the data price they pay 
and the precise benefits they receive. 
Importantly, many firms are familiar with these behavioral insights. 
They can therefore exploit consumers’ apathy to nudge them into sharing 
greater quantities of more valuable personal data.92 By not demanding 
monetary payment for the services they offer, companies can conceal the 
data costs consumers pay and magnify the benefits they receive.93 For now, 
consumers are mostly resigned to the terms set by data-driven service 
providers.94 They do not see these relationships as transactions.95 In the 
absence of tools to effectively assess the data price and utility, consumers 
cannot—and thus do not—scrutinize data-for-services deals. The privacy 
paradigm, although consumer-oriented, actually obstructs efforts to 
increase transactional transparency and, consequently, reinforces 
consumer apathy. 
C. The Return on Data Paradigm 
Despite consumers’ sense of resignation, the collection of personal data 
by tech firms continues to prompt vigorous debate and raise many 
questions. Should data collection be regulated? If so, how and by whom? 
What rights do consumers have in personal data relating to them? These 
and other important questions revolve around protecting personal data. 
They focus on privacy. According to a Pew survey, 80% of social media users 
are concerned about advertisers and businesses accessing the data they 
 
92. See, e.g., Christoph Bösch et al., Tales from the Dark Side: Privacy Dark 
Strategies and Privacy Dark Patterns, 4 PROC. PRIVACY ENHANCING TECH. 237 
(2016) (discussing companies’ deliberate efforts to avoid making privacy 
salient, causing consumers to undervalue privacy); Jeremy B. Merrill & Ariana 
Tobin, Facebook Moves to Block Ad Transparency Tools — Including Ours, 
PROPUBLICA (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-
blocks-ad-transparency-tools [https://perma.cc/HA4T-E2FW]. 
93. See SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 50. 
94. See Turow, supra note 49. 
95. See Arrieta-Ibarra et al., supra note 24. 
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share,96 and 83% of users support tougher privacy regulation.97 Yet, despite 
the pervasive lack of trust in social media platforms,98 social media usage 
continues to rise.99 Nearly seven-in-ten Americans use social media 
platforms,100 which invariably collect vast amounts of personal data. While 
some consumers take steps to protect their privacy,101 the overwhelming 
trend is to continue to pay for services with personal data. Data-for-services 
transactions are flourishing even in the face of privacy concerns.102 
According to the so-called “privacy paradox,” consumers assert that 
they want privacy but nonetheless opt to exchange personal data for 
services.103 How can this be explained? If data collection is simply the price 
 
96. Lee Rainie, Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era of 




97. See Inaugural Tech Media Telecom Pulse Survey, HARRISX 4, 10 (Apr. 2018), 
http://harrisx.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Inaugural-TMT-Pulse-
Survey_-20-Apr-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXA7-JGUZ]. 
98. See id. at 21; Trends in Customer Trust: The Future of Personalization, Data, and 
Privacy in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, SALESFORCE RESEARCH BRIEF at 4 
(Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.salesforce.com/form/conf/trust-research/ 
[https://perma.cc/T33D-XM25]. 
99. But see Kurt Wagner & Rani Molla, People Spent 50 Million Hours Less per Day 




100. See Rainie, supra note 96. 
101. See Andrew Perrin, Americans Are Changing Their Relationship with Facebook, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 5, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/09/05/americans-are-changing-their-relationship-with-
facebook/ [https://perma.cc/PR4J-DHLC] (suggesting that 54 percent of 
adult Facebook users have adjusted their privacy settings in the past 12 
months). 
102. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
103. See Idris Adjerid et al., Beyond the Privacy Paradox: Objective versus Relative 
Risk in Privacy Decision Making, 42 MGMT. INFO. SYS. Q. 465 (2018); Idris Adjerid 
et al., The Paradox of Wanting Privacy but Behaving as if It Didn’t Matter, LSE 
BUS. REV. (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2018/04/19/the-paradox-of-
wanting-privacy-but-behaving-as-if-it-didnt-matter. 
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of certain services, why are consumers reluctant to pay? Data-for-services 
transactions are, after all, a mutual exchange. Consumers supply data and 
receive services. Yet, the discourse relating to personal data addresses only 
what consumers give. It overlooks the utility consumers gain in return for 
the data they supply and fails to examine the relationship between the data 
price paid and the utility gained. These important issues are typically 
overshadowed by privacy concerns.104 
This fixation on privacy has been dubbed a “pessimism problem.”105 
Public and scholarly attention is directed toward the risks of data collection, 
not its benefits or the opportunities it creates. This is reinforced in many 
contexts. Non-governmental organizations working on technology policy 
overwhelmingly focus on privacy.106 Public surveys and indices relating to 
the data economy are primarily concerned with privacy.107 Journalists 
conduct privacy investigations,108 economists seek to optimize privacy 
decision-making,109 and legal scholars advocate data privacy law.110 
 
[https://perma.cc/G4D4-AW8Y]; Patricia A. Norberg, The Privacy Paradox: 
Personal Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER 
AFF. 100 (2007). But see Fuller, supra note 70. 
104. See, e.g., Allison S. Bohm et al., Privacy and Liberty in an Always-On, Always-
Listening World, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017) (examining data-
collecting technologies primarily through the lens of privacy); Swaroop 
Poudel, Internet of Things: Underlying Technologies, Interoperability, and 
Threats to Privacy and Security, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997, 1013 (2016) 
(regarding the privacy impacts of the IoT). But see Stucke, supra note 64, at 
287 (describing data collection as a price.) 
105. Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 441 (2016). 
106. See, e.g., Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy [https://perma.cc/ZYN6-8XE9]. 
107. See, e.g., 2018 Corporate Accountability Index, RANKING DIGITAL RIGHTS, 
https://rankingdigitalrights.org/index2018/categories/privacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/H4SL-9UNQ]; Computers and the Internet: Historical 
Trends, GALLUP (Sept. 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/1591/computers-
internet.aspx [https://perma.cc/D4CT-R5F5]. 
108. See, e.g., New York Times Privacy Project, N. Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/opinion/internet-privacy-
project.html [https://perma.cc/8NSW-3UBB]. 
109. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 86. 
110. See, e.g., Symposium, The Privacy Paradox: Privacy and Its Conflicting Values, 
64 STAN. L. REV. (2012); Symposium on Privacy and Technology, 126 HARV. L. 
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Company data policies are described as “privacy policies,”111 data law as 
“privacy law.”112 From industry to academia, the privacy paradigm 
dominates. Even those who acknowledge that consumers do not give away 
personal data for free pay little attention to the utility consumers gain in 
return for the personal data they supply.113 
What explains the dominance of the privacy paradigm? One possibility 
is that legislators and other policymakers are themselves consumers and, 
therefore, are not immune to the factors that discourage consumers from 
conceiving of their relationships with data-driven companies as 
transactional. As outlined above, these factors include: (1) Mental models. 
Due to a number of cognitive and behavioral biases, consumers do not 
experience data collection and data use as a price or scrutinize data-for-
services transactions as they scrutinize other transactions. (2) The “free” 
misnomer. Despite the privacy “techlash,” the seductive misnomer that 
many of the services of tech firms are free is surprisingly resilient. (3) 
Opaqueness. Data-for-services transactions remain opaque, due partly to 
the absence of tools for evaluating the merits of a given data-for-services 
deal. Upon failing to conceive of data-for-services deals as transactions, the 
privacy paradigm—by virtue of its rhetorical appeal and legal precedent—
is the natural fallback. 
These factors have further, far-reaching implications. They entrench an 
information asymmetry and cognitive asymmetry between consumers and 
the tech firms with which they interact. Data-driven companies can dictate 
to consumers the terms of data-for-services deals. They often present them 
as binary “take it or leave it” offers in which consumers must consent to 
broad data collection and use of personal data in order to access services, 
there being no intermediate option of supplying less data in exchange for 
inferior services. Tech firms can also exploit consumers’ apathy to nudge 
them into sharing greater quantities of more valuable personal data. They 
 
REV. (2013); Law, Privacy & Technology Commentary Series, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 1180 (2016); The Problem of Theorizing Privacy, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
i (2019); see also INT’L DATA PRIVACY LAW—an OUP peer-reviewed journal 
dedicated to data protection. 
111. See infra Section III.A. 
112. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL H. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (6th ed. 
2018) (the title of which refers to “privacy law”). 
113. See, e.g., Ariel Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy and 
User Expectations, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 4, 7 (2018) (recognizing data-for-
services transactions but advocating extensions of Balkin’s privacy 
proposals); see Balkin, infra note 149. 
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have no incentive to consider the relationship between the personal data 
they collect from consumers and the quality of the services they provide. To 
address these concerns, we need a new policy and legal paradigm. 
Andreas Weigend, former Amazon Chief Scientist, proposes engaging 
the concept of return on data (ROD), which adapts the notion of return on 
investment (ROI) to the data economy.114 According to ROI, when gauging 
the profitability of an investment, a business should consider not only the 
outlay of an investment (capital, labor, etc.), but also its expected gains. ROI 
equals the benefit of an investment divided by the cost of an investment.115 
Notwithstanding its limitations, ROI is a convenient, if rudimentary, 
measure of profitability, and can be applied to a wide range of activities. 
ROD is modeled on the classic ROI formula. It aims to help data-driven 
businesses measure the benefits of particular data relative to the cost of 
those data (collection, storage, use, etc.), and it equals the benefit of those 
data divided by their cost.116 
But, for consumers in data-for-services transactions, ROD has a 
different meaning.117 Where consumers pay for services with personal data, 
the benefit they gain is the utility of the services they receive, and the price 
is the value of the data they supply. Therefore, this Article proposes that in 
data-for-services transactions, ROD is the relationship between the utility (U) 
consumers gain and the data (D) they supply. Expressed as a ratio, ROD = U / 
 
114. See WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 3131–35, 3193–98; see also Timothy D. 
Sparapani, Putting Consumers at the Heart of the Social Media Revolution: 
Toward a Personal Property Interest to Protection Privacy, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1309, 
1318 (2012) (referring to a data-for-value equation). 
115. See Return on Investment (ROI), INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/returnoninvestment.asp 
[https://perma.cc/28YM-HYUQ]. 
116. See Dorian Selz, Return on Data, SQUIRRO (Jan. 20, 2016), 
https://squirro.com/2016/01/20/return-on-data/ 
[https://perma.cc/CB5K-3NCM]. Most references to ROD address only the 
service provider’s perspective, i.e., business strategies for best utilizing 
consumer data. See, e.g., Brad Brown et al., Capturing Value from Your 
Customer Data, MCKINSEY (Mar. 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/mckinsey-analytics/our-insights/capturing-value-from-your-
customer-data [https://perma.cc/7SBC-7EMN]. In this context, the benefits 
derived data, also described as the value of information (VoI), may itself be 
calculated as the (expected) utility from decisions made given the data in 
question, minus the (expected) utility from decisions made without the data 
in question. 
117. See infra Section V.A. 
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D. The higher the ROD ratio, the better the deal for the consumer. The lower 
the ROD ratio, the worse the deal for the consumer. Although it is difficult 
to calculate, ROD sends a powerful message. Just as businesses can quantify 
the profitability of data investments they make, individual consumers 
should be able to evaluate the merits of the data-for-services transactions 
they enter.118 
The introduction of ROD, whether as part of a legal framework or as a 
tool voluntarily adopted by tech firms, would enable consumers to better 
navigate the tradeoffs inherent in data-for-services transactions. ROD 
evaluations would nudge consumers toward conceiving of their 
relationships with data-driven companies as transactional. ROD would also 
make salient the data price individual consumers pay and thereby assist 
them in overcoming many of the cognitive and behavioral biases that rigidly 
ingrain the misnomer that services paid for with data are free. Making ROD 
transparent would reduce the information asymmetry between consumers 
and tech firms. Consumers would be able to determine whether a given 
data-for-services deal is in their best interests. In time, consumers might 
even seek to renegotiate these deals and demand greater ROD. 
Before leaping ahead, it is worth noting that ROD is likely to have broad 
appeal. A Deloitte survey found that respondents across several countries 
were more willing to share personal data when they received something 
valuable in exchange.119 In other words, consumers took interest in the 
returns on the data they supplied. In fact, 79% of respondents were only 
willing to share personal data if they clearly understood the benefits they 
were to receive.120 ROD is also likely to resonate with commentators who 
have called on tech firms to offer consumers more equitable data-for-
services deals.121 
The key takeaway is that the privacy paradigm is, on its own, 
inadequate.122 Although privacy concerns warrant continued technological 
innovation and regulation, there are other issues at stake. With few 
exceptions, the relationship between data price and services in any given 
transaction remains unknown. Perhaps consumers tend to get good deals. 
Perhaps they are being shortchanged. Data-for-services transactions, 
 
118. See WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 3131–39; 3142–46. 
119. See Pingitore et al., supra note 37. 
120. Id. 
121. See, e.g., Nahai & Chamorro-Premuzic, supra note 36. 
122. See id. (acknowledging that the right to privacy remains of paramount 
importance). 
RETURN ON DATA  
 107 
although pervasive, remain under-scrutinized. We therefore need to pivot 
away from the privacy-only paradigm and develop tools to assess ROD. Only 
if consumers can actually evaluate each data-for-services deal will they be 
able to engage in a cost-benefit analysis and make informed decisions on 
which deals to accept and which to reject. 
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
Most legal frameworks that govern data-for-services transactions are 
preoccupied with privacy. Privacy policies focus on the personal data 
consumers supply and how these data are used. They overlook the 
relationship between these data and the benefits consumers receive. 
Privacy law in both the United States and the EU aims to protect personal 
data, not to evaluate the data price consumers pay relative to the utility they 
receive. With the possible exception of an EU Directive that recognizes that 
the collection of personal data constitutes a form of payment, none of these 
legal frameworks examines what consumers receive in exchange for the 
data they supply. 
A. Terms of Service and Privacy Policies 
There are generally two documents that govern the relationship 
between a consumer and a data-driven service provider: the terms of 
service and privacy policy. Typically, the terms of service contain a variety 
of conditions, while privacy policies describe the types of personal data 
collected and how these data are used.123 As far as ROD is concerned, both 
documents are problematic. Each document addresses only one aspect of 
data-for-services transactions: terms of service relate to the services 
provided while privacy policies relate to the data collected. Terms of service 
address what consumers get. Privacy policies address what consumers 
give.124 By separating the data price consumers pay from the utility they 
 
123. See, e.g., Privacy Notice, AMAZON, 
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=asus_gen_n
ot?ie=UTF8&nodeId=468496&ld=ASUSGeneralDirect 
[https://perma.cc/QTG4-7FV3]; FACEBOOK, supra note 60; GOOGLE, supra note 
60; WhatsApp Legal Info, WHATSAPP, https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/ 
[https://perma.cc/9A59-ZY2C]. 
124. See SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 1 (recognizing that there is no single contract 
governing the bargain). 
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receive, these documents decouple data price from utility and, in doing so, 
implicitly deny that a mutual exchange takes place. 
In addition, it is well known that consumers have almost no influence 
over the terms of service and privacy policies that govern the services they 
use. These documents are “take it or leave it” contracts of adhesion. If, for 
example, a consumer wishes to install a mobile app, she must consent to the 
terms. Understandably, the average consumer does not bother reading 
them.125 These documents can be long, legalistic, and difficult to 
understand.126 As a result, consumers are not generally familiar with the 
terms on which they transact with service providers.127 
Nevertheless, consumers increasingly depend on the technologies that 
data-driven companies provide. Although there exist alternatives to Google 
Chrome and Google Search that do not involve data collection, such as the 
Brave browser and DuckDuckGo search engine, these are not necessarily 
adequate substitutes.128 We cannot expect consumers to refrain from using 
technologies provided by Big Tech. “Exiting” Google or Facebook is not 
 
125. See, e.g., Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer 
Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014); Caroline 
Cakebread, You’re Not Alone, No One Reads Terms of Service Agreements, BUS. 
INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/deloitte-study-
91-percent-agree-terms-of-service-without-reading-2017-11 
[https://perma.cc/Q6UD-VSYY] (revealing that over 90% of consumers 
accept terms of service without reading them); Kevin Litman-Navarro, We 
Read 150 Privacy Policies. They Were an Incomprehensible Disaster, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 12, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/12/opinion/facebook-
google-privacy-policies.html [https://perma.cc/655D-43RY]. 
126. See Shmuel I. Becher & Uri Benoliel, The Duty to Read the Unreadable, 60 B.C. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy 
Policies: Mismatches Between Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 39 (2015); How Silicon Valley Puts the ‘Con’ in Consent, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/02/opinion/internet-
facebook-google-consent.html [https://perma.cc/ACH8-F2CN]. 
127. Cf. WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 921–22 (suggesting that most Gmail users 
consciously exchange data for free email). 
128. The same arguably applies to substituting Apple Maps for Google Maps. See 
Apple Maps vs. Google Maps: Which Is Better?, THE MANIFEST (Sept. 12, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@the_manifest/apple-maps-vs-google-maps-which-is-
better-9ceaf28f9bf0 [https://perma.cc/3L89-CZ3P]. 
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generally straightforward (or even possible).129 Public-interest technologist 
Bruce Schneier explains that: 
It’s not reasonable to tell people that if they don’t like the data 
collection, they shouldn’t e-mail, shop online, use Facebook, or have 
a cell phone . . . .These are the tools of modern life. They’re 
necessary to a career and a social life. Opting out just isn’t a viable 
choice for most of us, most of the time . . . .130 
Tech firms control the terms of data-for-services transactions.131 
Consumers cannot realistically negotiate the data price or demand higher 
ROD. Due to consumers’ dependence on these technologies and the 
information asymmetry between consumers and companies, some 
commentators have questioned the authenticity of consumers’ consent to 
these transactions.132 Consent, they suggest, is presumed or engineered,133 
or perhaps given under duress. Firms equipped with data-driven analytics 
can nudge consumers into accepting the deals they offer. They can exploit 
 
129. See Kashmir Hill, Life Without the Tech Giants, GIZMODO (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://gizmodo.com/life-without-the-tech-giants-1830258056 
[https://perma.cc/38GK-CS7P]; Hamza Shaban, Facebook Literally Can’t Be 
Deleted on Some Phones, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/01/09/facebook-
literally-cant-be-deleted-some-phones/ [https://perma.cc/XZE6-FDKS]. 
130. SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 57-59, 60–61. 
131. See Stucke, supra note 64, at 289 (explaining that consumers have no viable 
alternative to consenting); see also POSNER & WEYL, supra note 22, at 231 
(discussing “technofeudalism”); Data Workers of the World, Unite: What If 
People Were Paid for Their Data?, ECONOMIST (July 7, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/the-world-if/2018/07/07/what-if-people-
were-paid-for-their-data [https://perma.cc/5RBY-L5BK] (discussing “data 
slavery”). 
132. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for 
Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 67 (2012). Notably, the GDPR relies 
heavily on consent. See, e.g., GDPR, infra note 136, at rec. 31; see also Scott 
Berinato, “Stop Thinking About Consent: It Isn’t Possible and It Isn’t Right”, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 24, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/stop-thinking-
about-consent-it-isnt-possible-and-it-isnt-right [https://perma.cc/8XMY-
YPHB] (discussing Helen Nissenbaum’s objections to the reliance on consent). 
133. See Nancy Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1327, 1330 (2011). 
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individuals’ personal traits and biases to manipulate their decision-
making.134 
These concerns, however, do not suggest that contract law does not, or 
cannot, apply to data-for-services transactions. There is no legal rule 
precluding data from constituting contractual consideration or payment. 
Contract law may well be the most appropriate legal framework for 
governing these transactions.135 Nevertheless, terms of service and privacy 
policies currently fail to treat data collection as the price consumers pay for 
services. By obscuring the quid pro quo inherent in these deals, terms of 
service and privacy policies give the false impression that the services 
provided are genuinely free. 
To engage with ROD, terms of service and privacy policies need to be 
more transparent. They need to openly and expressly communicate that an 
exchange takes place. If consumers internalize the notion of data-for-
services transactions, they may reconsider blindly consenting to every deal 
offered to them. Consumers may scrutinize and even seek to renegotiate the 
deals they enter. A refusal to pay exorbitant data prices would, in time, 
signal to service providers consumers’ demand for more favorable deals. 
B. Privacy Law 
The preoccupation with privacy and failure to engage with ROD are 
buttressed by the current data protection regimes. The EU’s General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) treats privacy as a fundamental right and 
affords individuals various data protections. These include data access 
rights, data portability, and privacy breach notifications.136 In the United 
States, there is no equivalent regime that comprehensively regulates the 
collection and use of data by private entities or treats data privacy vis-à-vis 
 
134. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 
1003 (2014). 
135. Although, due to the doctrine of privity, privacy policies and terms of service 
are unlikely to bind third parties— i.e., parties other than the consumer and 
service provider. 
136. See EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Regulation (EU) 
2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 L 119/1; see also 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8 2010 O.J. C 83/02. 
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non-governmental actors as a fundamental right.137 Instead, there is a 
patchwork of judge-made law,138 sector-specific legislation,139 contractual 
arrangements, and industry practices.140 However, California’s Consumer 
Privacy Act (CCPA) signals a shift toward the EU’s approach and, beginning 
in 2020, will grant Californians the right to prohibit the sharing and sale of 
personal data to third parties.141 
Despite their differences, both the U.S. and EU data protection regimes 
embrace the privacy paradigm. They center on data protection, not ROD. 
Although the principles they enshrine and the methods they endorse differ 
greatly, privacy law on both sides of the Atlantic treats transactions 
involving personal data as a privacy issue.142 Like privacy policies, privacy 
law currently addresses only one aspect of data-for-services transactions—
the collection and use of personal data.143 It does not examine what 
consumers receive in exchange for the data they supply. 
The following legal frameworks and proposals confirm that the 
overarching concern of privacy law is data protection. The GDPR and the 
proposed EU ePrivacy Regulation, as their titles suggest, aim primarily to 
protect personal data.144 The FTC’s Fair Information Practices (FIPs) are an 
industry data protection regime.145 Legal textbooks relating to personal 
 
137. But there are constitutional protections against data collection carried out by 
government actors. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); 
DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (2017). However, 
it is private actors that carry out the majority of data collection. See SCHNEIER, 
supra note 2, at 47. 
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E. 
139. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320d-6 (2012). 
140. See, e.g., SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 112, at 785. 
141. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798 (as amended by Consumer Privacy Act (A.B. 375)). 
142. See generally Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to 
Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966 (2013); Paul M. Schwartz 
& Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and 
European Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. 877, 878–81 (2014). 
143. This of course is a valuable and necessary function, given the importance of 
the right to privacy. However, it alone is not sufficient. 
144. See GDPR, supra note 136, at rec. 6. 
145. See CHRIS HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 216-35 
(2016); SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 112, at 975. 
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data are privacy-oriented.146 The debate on establishing property rights in 
personal data centers around privacy concerns.147 Recent proposals also 
revolve around data protection: introducing a Bill of Data Rights to protect 
individuals’ privacy,148 treating data collectors as information fiduciaries 
obligated to safeguard personal data,149 and mandating the integration of 
data protection into product design.150 None contemplates the ROD of 
consumers or other data subjects. 
By addressing only one aspect of data-for-services deals, these legal 
regimes fail to scrutinize—and even obscure—the mutual exchange that 
underpins data-for-services transactions. The GDPR, for example, does not 
clarify the role of data collection as payment.151 Although the GDPR bolsters 
transparency around the processing of personal data, it does not require 
companies to disclose whether personal data constitute the price payable 
 
146. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 112.; see also MARC ROTENBERG & ANITA L. ALLEN, 
PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY (2016). 
147. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2055, 2093, 2095–2116 (2004); see also Victor, supra note 19, at 518–19 
(explaining that several legal scholars do not propose free markets in 
personal data, but highly regulated property regimes specifically designed to 
protect personal data). 
148. See, e.g., Russell Brandom, DuckDuckGo Wrote a Bill to Stop Advertisers from 
Tracking You Online, VERGE (May 1, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/1/18525140/do-not-track-
duckduckgo-ad-tracking [https://perma.cc/5MA7-3C9D]; Martin Tisné, It’s 
Time for a Bill of Data Rights, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 14, 2018), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612588/its-time-for-a-bill-of-data-
rights/ [https://perma.cc/P3XL-9RS5]; will.i.am, We Need to Own Our Data as 
a Human Right—and Be Compensated for It, ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.economist.com/open-future/2019/01/21/we-need-to-own-
our-data-as-a-human-right-and-be-compensated-for-it 
[https://perma.cc/R5AX-H4RW]; see also Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 
115th Cong. (2018) (introduced by Senator Brian Schatz); Consumer Data 
Protection Act, S.I.L. 18B29, 115th Cong. (2018) (introduced by Senator Ron 
Wyden). 
149. See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016); Lina M. Khan & David Pozen, A Skeptical View of 
Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
150. See R. JASON CRONK, STRATEGIC PRIVACY BY DESIGN (2018); WOODROW HARTZOG, 
PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
(2018). 
151. See GDPR, supra note 136, at recs. 39, 60, 71; arts. 5(1)(a), 12. 
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for services.152 Privacy law thus fails to holistically address the bargains 
consumers routinely make. By overlooking what consumers receive in 
return for the data they supply, privacy law maintains a very narrow focus. 
C. Data as “Counter-Performance” 
The GDPR is not the only pioneering EU legal development in the field 
of personal data. The EU Directive for consumer protection in contracts for 
the supply of digital content signals a potential shift toward the ROD 
paradigm.153 Rather than merely enhance data protection, as the GDPR 
does, the Directive confronts the reality of consumers paying for services 
with personal data. The original proposed version of the Directive, however, 
did so more explicitly than the version ultimately adopted by the European 
Parliament, and sought to expressly regulate data-for-services transactions. 
Article 3(1) of the Proposed Directive stated that: 
This Directive shall apply to any contract where the supplier 
supplies digital content to the consumer or undertakes to do so and, 
in exchange, a price is to be paid or the consumer actively provides 
counter-performance other than money in the form of personal data 
or any other data.154 
The Proposed Directive aimed to treat personal data as the “counter-
performance” provided in exchange for services. In common law 
terminology, personal data would constitute contractual consideration. By 
way of explanation, Recital 13 of the Proposed Directive provided that: 
In the digital economy, information about individuals is often and 
increasingly seen by market participants as having a value 
comparable to money. Digital content is often supplied not in 
 
152. Id. at art. 13 (listing the information which data controllers must provide to 
data subjects). 
153. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Certain Aspects Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital 
Content, COM (2015) 634 final (Dec. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Proposed Directive], 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015PC0634&from=en 
[https://perma.cc/WU7Q-6VK7] (indicating the current status and legislative 
progress of the Directive). 
154. Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added); see also id. at 26, 31 (concerning arts. 6(2), 
15(2)(b), and 16(4)(a) respectively). 
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exchange for a price but against counter-performance other than 
money i.e. by giving access to personal data or other data.155 
The language of the Proposed Directive speaks for itself.156 It recognizes 
that consumers pay for certain services with personal data. The Proposed 
Directive enjoyed broad support from EU institutions,157 legal scholars,158 
consumer groups,159 and some industry groups.160 Supporters of the 
Proposed Directive applauded it for treating data as “counter-performance” 
and, thereby, extending consumer protections to data-for-services 
 
155. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
156. By comparison, the endorsement of the notion of data constituting counter-
performance that features in the version of the Directive adopted by the 
European Parliament is far more subtle. See Directive 2019/770, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on Certain Aspects 
Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content and Digital Services, 
2019 O.J. (L 136) 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019L0770&from=en 
[https://perma.cc/UE6H-3SKN]. Article 2(7) states that “‘price’ means money 
or a digital representation of value that is due in exchange for the supply of 
digital content or a digital service.” Id. at 17. Assuming data amount to a 
“digital representation of value,” the Directive implies that data can comprise 
the price that consumers pay. 
157. See, e.g., Report on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on Certain Aspects Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital 





158. See, e.g., Gerald Spindler, Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content—Scope of 
Application and Basic Approach, 12 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 183, 191–92 (2016); 
Hugh Beale, Scope of Application and General Approach of the New Rules for 
Contracts in the Digital Environment (Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights 
and Constitutional Affairs) at 12–13 (2016), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/98770/Beale.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/57Q6-W8PB]. 
159. See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment, at 62, 122–
23, COM (2015) 274 final (Dec. 17, 2015), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=SWD%3A2015%3A274%3AREV1 
[https://perma.cc/57Q6-W8PB]. 
160. See, e.g., id. at 63. 
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transactions.161 The Directive, even in its final form, is groundbreaking. 
Unlike other legal frameworks, it acknowledges the existence of, and 
directly tackles, data-for-services transactions. 
However, the Directive, following its original proposal, has also been 
criticized. Several industry groups suggested that, if enacted, it would 
overregulate and hamper the data economy.162 Others suggested that it 
would inhibit contractual freedom and undermine the kind of transactions 
that foster technological innovation.163 The European Data Protection 
Supervisor, an independent EU institution, while supporting the Directive’s 
expansion of consumer protections, contended that personal data must not 
be treated as a price or payment for services. Commodifying personal data, 
it reasoned, would infringe fundamental rights, such as privacy, and reduce 
them to commercial interests.164 But this criticism is anachronistic. It 
ignores the reality that consumers routinely exchange personal data for 
services. Personal data are already, among other things, a commodity. 
Another criticism related to Article 3(4) of the Proposed Directive, 
which provided that the Proposed Directive would not apply to personal 
data that are “strictly necessary for the performance of the contract.”165 The 
problem here is that it is not always clear which data are “necessary” for a 
 
161. See Helberger et al., supra note 75, at 1445. 
162. See, e.g., BUSINESS EUROPE, Position Paper on the Harmonisation of Contract 
Rules for Digital Content and Tangible Goods 5 (Sept. 3, 2015), 
https://www.businesseurope.eu/publications/harmonisation-contract-
rules-digital-content-and-tangible-goods [https://perma.cc/XKW4-ZZLS]. 
163. See AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, Joint Industry 
Declaration on the Digital Content Directive 2 (May 24, 2016), 
http://www.amchameu.eu/media-centre/press-releases/joint-industry-
declaration-digital-content-directive [https://perma.cc/G7DC-JXN5]. 
164. See EDPS, supra note 45, at 7 (likening markets in personal data to human 
organ trafficking). See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE 
MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012) (advocating certain limits on 
commodification); cf. JASON BRENNAN & PETER JAWORSKI, MARKETS WITHOUT 
LIMITS: MORAL VIRTUES AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS 10 (2016) (criticizing anti-
commodification theorists). Compare Sandel with Alvin Roth, Repugnance as 
a Constraint on Markets, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 37 (2007); ALVIN E. ROTH, WHO 
GETS WHAT—AND WHY: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF MATCHMAKING AND MARKET DESIGN 
195 (2016) (questioning the moral opprobrium ascribed to “repugnant” 
transactions).  
165. Proposed Directive, supra note 153, at 14 (emphasis added). 
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particular service to function.166 For instance, while a mobile payments app 
might not require location data, those data may significantly enhance the 
app’s security. More fundamentally, even if it were clear which data are 
necessary for a particular service to function, the data supplied (both those 
that are necessary and those that are not) still constitute the price paid for 
the services. The mere fact that location data are deemed necessary for the 
service should not exempt them from the Directive.167 
Furthermore, the Proposed Directive has been criticized for 
distinguishing between consumers who pay for services with money and 
consumers who pay with personal data,168 as has the CCPA.169 
Notwithstanding studies that suggest that the form of payment—monetary 
or non-monetary—does not impact the level of legal protection that 
consumers expect,170 the Proposed Directive afforded consumers who pay 
with money greater legal protection.171 By discriminating against 
consumers who pay for services with personal data, the Proposed Directive 
 
166. Madalena Narciso, ‘Gratuitous’ Digital Content Contracts, J. EUR. CONSUMER & 
MARKET L., 198 , 205 (2017). See infra note 287 (regarding data efficiency). 
167. See Vanessa Mak, The New Proposal for Harmonised Rules on Certain Aspects 
Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content (Policy Dept C: Citizens’ 
Rights and Constitutional Affairs) at 9 (2016), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/98771/Mak.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RRH-N733]. 
168. Id. at 17–18. 
169. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.125(a)(2) (as amended by Consumer Privacy Act 
(A.B. 375)) (“Nothing . . . prohibits a business from charging a consumer a 
different price or rate, or from providing a different level or quality of goods 
or services to the consumer, if that difference is reasonably related to the 
value provided to the consumer by the consumer’s data.”); see also id. 
§ 1798.125(b)(1) (“A business may also offer a different price, rate, level, or 
quality of goods or services to the consumer if that price or difference is 
directly related to the value provided to the consumer by the consumer’s 
data.”). 
170. See Madalena Narciso, Consumer Expectations in Digital Content Contracts – An 
Empirical Study 19–21 (Tilburg Priv. Law, Working Paper No. 01/2017, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2954491 
[https://perma.cc/HHT9-S3J2]. 
171. See Proposed Directive, supra note 153, at 29-30 (concerning art. 13(2)); id. at 
21 (concerning rec. 42 and its discussion of termination rights). 
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would have undercut its goal of treating all consumers equally, irrespective 
of how they pay.172 
The Directive has spawned vigorous debate and is therefore a welcome 
development. By regulating data-for-services deals, the Directive 
recognizes the reality of these transactions. While other legal frameworks, 
such as privacy policies and privacy law, are preoccupied with privacy, the 
Directive engages with the underlying exchange between consumers and 
companies. However, despite its recognition of personal data as a form of 
payment, the Directive fails in one key respect: it does not actually assist in 
making data-for-services transactions more transparent. It does not 
institute ROD assessments or enable consumers to better navigate the 
tradeoffs inherent in these transactions. 
IV. DATA PLATFORMS 
Like most of the legal frameworks discussed so far, many data platforms 
perpetuate the privacy paradigm. Some platforms enable consumers to pay 
a monetary premium to avoid or minimize personal data collection. Others 
offer monetary discounts to consumers willing to share additional personal 
data. Meanwhile, platforms that monitor and manage the collection and use 
of personal data—privacy tech—aim to protect personal data. Yet, some 
platforms have begun to challenge the privacy paradigm. Data exchanges 
and data investment platforms give consumers the opportunity to sell 
personal data for cash or in-kind benefits. By offering consumers assets of 
concrete value in exchange for personal data, they implicitly embrace the 
notion of ROD. But they too are imperfect. These platforms only offer 
consumers the opportunity to enter new deals—that is, to strike fresh 
bargains. These platforms do not engage with the many data-for-services 
transactions that consumers already enter with Facebook, Google, etc. The 
ROD of these transactions remains unknown. 
A. Privacy Tech 
Privacy monitors and personal information management systems 
(PIMs) are perhaps the most common privacy tech tools.173 Privacy 
 
172. See Spindler, supra note 158, at 198–99. 
173. See VRM Development Work: Personal Information Management Systems, 
PROJECT VRM, 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/projectvrm/VRM_Development_Work#Personal_
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monitors, sometimes called privacy dashboards, aim to display to users how 
personal data relating to them are collected and used. For example, Lumen 
Privacy Monitor, an Android app, monitors the type, volume, and (apparent) 
purpose of data collection carried out by mobile apps.174 Tools like this 
helpfully reveal to consumers how the personal data they generate are 
collected and used. 
Although privacy monitors have not proved especially popular, their 
potential use cases are likely to expand, particularly as the IoT grows. 
However, from the perspective of ROD, privacy monitors are lacking. They 
only gauge data collection. They do not assess what consumers receive in 
exchange for the data they supply. As a result, privacy monitors cannot 
evaluate the merits of data-for-services transactions, let alone indicate 
where greater ROD may be available. 
PIMs provide greater functionality than privacy monitors as they enable 
consumers to exercise control over the personal data they generate.175 For 
example, MyPermissions Privacy Cleaner enables consumers to control the 
data collection permissions of mobile apps.176 Other PIMs function as 
gatekeepers between consumers and third parties seeking access to 
personal data.177 Like privacy monitors, PIMs seek to empower consumers 




174. See Lumen Privacy Monitor, GOOGLE PLAY, 
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=edu.berkeley.icsi.haystack 
[https://perma.cc/UEA5-BJFL]. 
175. See, e.g., Christoph Busch, Implementing Personalized Law: Personalized 
Disclosures in Consumer Law and Data Privacy Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 309, 322-
324 (2019); The Personalized Privacy Assistant Project, PRIVACYASSISTANT.ORG, 
https://www.privacyassistant.org/ [https://perma.cc/QN44-N4JJ]. 
176. See MYPERMISSIONS PRIVACY CLEANER, https://mypermissions.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/MTE4-YKWS]. Other privacy monitors, such as Ghostery 
and Privacy Badger, also function as PIMs by blocking trackers automatically 
or at a user’s request. 
177. See, e.g., DIGI.ME, https://digi.me/ [https://perma.cc/4ANE-75ZP]. 
178. See generally Anita L. Allen, An Ethical Duty to Protect One’s Own Information 
Privacy?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 845 (2013); Anita L. Allen, Protecting One’s Own 
Privacy in a Big Data Economy, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 71, 72–73 (2016).  But see 
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 105, at 444 (suggesting that privacy self-
management is highly problematic); Solove, supra note 73.  
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But therein lies the problem. The aim of these privacy tools is to protect 
personal data. Whether by informing consumers of data security risks or 
actively managing personal data, privacy tech concentrates on improving 
privacy protection. It does not engage with the benefits consumers receive 
in exchange for sharing personal data. Privacy tech, notwithstanding the 
benefits it delivers, addresses only the data price consumers pay. It 
overlooks the underlying give-and-take in data-for-services transactions 
and does not attempt to make ROD transparent. 
B. Paying for Privacy 
Today, there is an increasing number of opportunities for consumers to 
pay for privacy.179 In exchange for paying a monetary premium, consumers 
can in some contexts limit the scope of data collection when they access 
certain services. For example, consumers can pay a fee to use virtual private 
networks (VPNs), which help protect user privacy.180 At the same time, 
several service providers have begun to offer consumers monetary 
discounts in exchange for consumers sharing more personal data. Some 
automotive insurers, for example, offer discount rates to consumers who 
permit the collection of driving data.181 
 
179. See generally Elvy, supra note 2; Nahai & Chamorro-Premuzic, supra note 36. 
180. See Elvy, supra note 2, at 1388–91 (discussing the “privacy-as-a-luxury” 
model); see also CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 168–71 (2016). 
Several commentators advocate expanding the pay-for-privacy model by 
demanding the option of paid subscriptions to social media platforms. See 
TIEN TZUO, SUBSCRIBED: WHY THE SUBSCRIPTION MODEL WILL BE YOUR COMPANY’S 
FUTURE—AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2018); Calo, supra note 134, at 1047–48; 
Philip Hacker & Bilyana Petkova, Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: 
Transparency, Inequality, and New Regulatory Frontiers, 15 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 20, 22–27, 36 (2017); see also Zeynep Tufekci, Mark Zuckerberg, 
Let Me Pay for Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/opinion/zeynep-tufekci-mark-
zuckerberg-let-me-pay-for-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/HR4E-9T27]. 
But see Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (discussing Zuckerberg’s statement that 
most consumers prefer not to, or would be unable to, pay money for 
Facebook’s services); Kurt Wagner, Mark Zuckerberg Explains Why an Ad-Free 
Facebook Isn’t as Simple as It Sounds, RECODE (Feb. 20, 2019), 
https://www.recode.net/2019/2/20/18233640/mark-zuckerberg-
explains-ad-free-facebook [https://perma.cc/JTN8-UGX3]. 
181. See O’NEIL, supra note 180, at 168; Mark Chalon Smith, State Farm’s In-Drive 
Discount: What’s the Catch?, CARINSURANCE.COM (June 12, 2015), 
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These opportunities seem empowering. Consumers, at least in theory, 
are given a choice.182 Those who prize privacy can pay a premium to protect 
personal data relating to them, while those who are less concerned about 
privacy can enjoy monetary discounts in exchange for supplying more data. 
It looks like a win-win situation. But there is a catch. Many consumers have 
only a limited understanding of privacy risks and may therefore opt for 
monetary discounts over data protection.183 The prospect of a monetary 
discount entices them to supply more personal data. In addition, not all 
consumers are in a position to pay a monetary premium (or refuse a 
monetary discount) in order to protect their privacy. Many consumers, even 
if they are particularly concerned about their privacy, may be financially 
compelled to supply more personal data.184 
Despite these shortcomings, the opportunity to pay for privacy has 
some advantages. By paying a monetary price to collect and use personal 
data, companies signal to consumers that personal data are commercially 
valuable. Although the monetary premiums and discounts offered by 
companies might not accurately reflect the value of personal data,185 they 
nevertheless imply that the value of data is not only personal or 
psychological, but financial. This, of course, is a prerequisite for 
understanding and embracing ROD. 
Nevertheless, the idea of paying for privacy could be seen as somewhat 
antiquated. It may already be too late for individuals to begin to pay to 
protect their privacy. Personal data relating to them are perhaps already 
scattered so widely that prospectively restricting their dissemination would 
be fruitless.186 But, in reality, new personal data are continuously being 




182. But see supra Section III.A. 
183. See Elvy, supra note 2, at 1388; see also supra Section II.C. 
184. See O’NEIL, supra note 180, at 171; Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling 
Privacy: Big Data’s Different Burdens and Benefits, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 
48 (2013). 
185. See sources cited supra note 53 (regarding the difficulty in determining the 
value of data). 
186. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION ch. 2 (2015); Strandburg, supra note 26, at 
145, 150. However, the “right to be forgotten” may facilitate the deletion of 
certain information. See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 136, at art. 17. See generally 
Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2012). 
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Therefore, opportunities to pay for privacy may indeed empower 
consumers going forward, enabling at least some of them to actively choose 
between financial considerations and privacy interests. 
However, opportunities to pay for privacy face another issue. They do 
not tackle data-for-services transactions in which no money changes hands. 
The ability to pay a monetary premium for privacy in highly specific 
contexts does not enable or inspire consumers to assess what they receive 
in return for the data they supply in routine data-for-services deals. 
Opportunities to pay for privacy do not make these transactions any more 
transparent, let alone equitable. 
C. Selling and Investing Personal Data 
Several platforms now enable consumers to sell or invest personal data. 
Datacoup, perhaps the most well-known personal data exchange (PDE), 
allows consumers to sell personal data for cash.187 Users decide which data 
points to make available to the platform, which then determines the amount 
of cash they receive. PDEs clearly give consumers the opportunity to benefit 
from personal data in new ways. The data-for-services transactions that 
they facilitate are relatively transparent. PDEs are upfront about trading 
personal data for various benefits. They do not conceal the give-and-take 
but embrace it. PDE users consciously choose which personal data to share 
and know what to expect in return.188 ROD, in these cases, is comparatively 
explicit and clear-cut. 
Yet, PDEs have not proved especially popular.189 This might be because 
they tend to pay consumers only relatively small sums of money,190 which 
is partly attributable to the fact that payments are made prior to the data 
being aggregated and monetized. Datacoup’s website, for example, 
 
187. See How It Works, DATACOUP, https://datacoup.com/docs#how-it-works 
[https://perma.cc/N287-AZPZ]. 
188. Cf. supra Section II.A (regarding the misalignment between data prices and 
services). 
189. See Mindaugas Kiskis, Ever Dreamed of Selling Your Data for Cash? Dream On, 
NEXT WEB (July 7, 2018), 
https://thenextweb.com/contributors/2018/07/07/ever-dreamed-of-
selling-your-data-for-cash-dream-on/ [https://perma.cc/M2BR-6B8V]. 
190. See Gregory Barber, I Sold My Data for Crypto. Here’s How Much I Made, WIRED 
(Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/i-sold-my-data-for-crypto/ 
[https://perma.cc/J2K6-HP8V]. 
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showcases a user earning just $1.10 a week from the platform.191 The 
conceptual impact of PDEs has also been limited, perhaps because PDEs 
only facilitate new transactions. PDEs have no impact whatsoever on the 
vast number of data-for-services transactions consumers have already 
entered. For example, the opportunity to sell location data to Datacoup does 
not affect a consumer’s ongoing relationship with Waze, to which she 
already supplies the same location data (in return for navigation services). 
Forging new relationships with PDEs does not illuminate or affect existing 
relationships with data-driven service providers. 
One possible solution is to introduce elements of PDEs into existing 
data-for-services transactions. Consumers could receive a small monetary 
payment (“micropayment”) for every unit of data they share with service 
providers.192 However, micropayments have been widely criticized on 
several grounds. First, it may be unclear who should be entitled to a given 
micropayment, particularly as data relating to one person are often 
collected from others.193 Second, there is no accepted method for 
determining what amounts would be paid, especially given that the value of 
data usually materializes later in the data’s lifecycle.194 Third, 
micropayments might impose additional transaction costs on consumers.195 
Fourth, developing systems and infrastructure to facilitate micropayments 
 
191. See DATACOUP, supra note 187. 
192. See LANIER, supra note 19, at 6, 317; POSNER & WEYL, supra note 22, at 247; 
Jakob Nielson, The Case for Micropayments, NIELSON NORMAN GROUP (Jan. 25, 
1998), https://www.nngroup.com/articles/the-case-for-micropayments/ 
[https://perma.cc/J6NS-ZGKD]. 
193. See WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 508–23 (discussing who will receive the 
payment where one person uploads a photo which features other people); see 
also sources cited supra note 59 (regarding passive data collection). Notably, 
the need to disaggregate personal data on an individual basis is also a 
challenge for ROD, which purports to separately evaluate the utility-to-data 
ratio for each individual user. 
194. See WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 508–23; see also supra note 53 (regarding the 
difficulty in determining the value of data). This issue is less relevant to ROD, 
which does not purport to price data. However, subsequent changes in the 
value of the data from the consumer’s perspective may alter the ROD score over 
time. See infra Section V.A.2. 
195. See ANDERSON, supra note 20, at 45, 48 (discussing Nick Szabo, Micropayments 
and Mental Transaction Costs, SATOSHI NAKAMOTO INST. (undated), 
http://nakamotoinstitute.org/static/docs/micropayments-and-mental-
transaction-costs.pdf [https://perma.cc/6463-BTNN]); see also infra note 
210 (regarding the imposition of transaction costs under ROD). 
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would be costly.196 Fifth, consumers might not actually be interested in 
receiving minute monetary payments in exchange for sharing highly 
sensitive personal data.197 
Apart from these notable concerns, the introduction of micropayments 
into existing data-for-services transactions poses a more fundamental 
problem. The establishment of a new system of payments arguably implies 
that consumers do not presently receive sufficient compensation for the 
data they supply. It suggests that consumers deserve additional payment. 
Yet, given that most existing data-for-services transactions are opaque, we 
cannot at present actually assess what compensation consumers receive, let 
alone judge whether it is equitable. Due to the lack of transparency, there is 
currently no reliable way to know whether or not consumers are getting fair 
deals. 
Some PDEs may signal a change of direction and tentative shift toward 
ROD. Datavest, a data investment platform, appears to ask the right 
questions: “how much have you actually paid Facebook? Instagram? Or 
Waze? And by how much have you overpaid LinkedIn, Uber, Experian, 
AMEX, or 23andMe? . . . If you’re unsure, you’re not alone.”198 Datavest 
prompts consumers to reflect on how much they earn from the data they 
supply. But again, there is no indication that the platform will in fact make 
existing data-for-services transactions more transparent. 
V. IMPLEMENTING RETURN ON DATA 
So far, we have seen how the legal frameworks that govern data-for-
services transactions embrace the privacy paradigm. We have also seen 
how privacy tech is geared toward data protection. Although these 
frameworks and platforms bolster consumers’ control over personal data, 
they overlook the relationship between the data consumers supply and the 
services they receive. Consumers cannot presently evaluate the merits of 
the data-for-services transactions they enter or make informed decisions on 
how to spend and invest personal data. 
 
196. See WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 523–27. 
197. See id. at 508–31. By contrast, under ROD, it is hoped that consumers will 
eventually receive superior services and/or supply less personal data, both of 
which are likely to appeal to them. 
198. Rob Nicholas Stone, Data as Capital, MEDIUM (May 24, 2018), 
https://medium.com/datavest/data-as-capital-d2a07533b04a 
[https://perma.cc/67KG-M2C9]; see also DATAVEST, 
https://www.datavest.org/ [https://perma.cc/7YL5-WJQQ]. 
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To effect the necessary paradigm shift, this Section maps out how ROD 
can be implemented in practice. First, it outlines a conceptual framework 
for assessing ROD and considers the most appropriate use cases. Next, this 
Section examines how best to engage consumers and enable them to 
scrutinize data-for-services transactions. Last, this Section explores 
potential regulatory and other pathways to adopting ROD, with the aim of 
creating a competitive market in which tech firms are incentivized to 
maximize consumers’ ROD. 
A. Principles for Evaluating Return on Data 
At present, there is no precise formula, algorithm, or diagnostic tool for 
gauging the relationship between the utility consumers gain and the data 
price they pay.199 Before attempting to advance more concrete proposals, 
developers and lawmakers need at least a tentative conceptual framework 
for evaluating data-for-services transactions. The following principles, 
explored below, aim to provide this framework: 
 
1. ROD gauges the relationship between the utility (U) consumers gain 
and the data (D) they supply in data-for-services transactions. Expressed as a 
ratio, ROD = U / D. 
2. ROD evaluations need to be personalized and dynamic. 
3. To assess ROD, you need to collect personal data. 
4. ROD evaluations are most appropriate for comparing transactions in 
which similar services are provided. 
1. ROD = U / D 
ROD gauges the relationship between two variables in data-for-services 
transactions: (i) the benefits consumers receive and (ii) the data price they 
pay. Calculating the ratio between these variables in a given data-for-
services transaction yields the ROD. This is different from Weigend’s notion 
of “data efficiency,” which relates to the purpose of data collection.200 Data 
efficiency considers whether the data collected are a genuine input into the 
services provided. Weigend likens data to fuel, which can be used with 
varying degrees of efficiency. For example, a mobile navigation app that 
collects only location data necessary for the user to reach the destination 
 
199. See sources cited supra note 53 (regarding the difficulty in determining the 
value of data); see also WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 3119–20. 
200. See WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 3048–50, 3146–58. 
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would be “data efficient.” In contrast, a mobile game that collects personal 
data unrelated to the game would be “data inefficient.” 
The notion of data efficiency is problematic for several reasons. First, 
although data are indeed inputs into many services, the analogy between 
data and fuel is questionable. Unlike fuel, data are not fungible.201 Second, it 
is not always clear which data are necessary for, or actually improve, the 
services provided.202 Some data may contribute only to future 
developments, not present applications.203 Are these data genuine inputs 
into the services? Third, the potential uses of data are not always apparent 
prior to or upon collection. The possibilities for downstream use are 
endless.204 Therefore, the purpose of collection may emerge only later.205 
Fourth, consumers are unlikely to be concerned about data efficiency.206 
Consider the fact that in ordinary retail transactions consumers do not fret 
over whether the money they pay contributes to the product they purchase. 
Rather, consumers care about how much they spend and for what. In 
conducting a cost-benefit analysis, consumers weigh up the benefits of a 
product against its price, which is precisely the function of ROD. 
The application of cost-benefit analysis to data-for-services deals raises 
another question. Should ROD factor in monetary payments that consumers 
 
201. See supra note 54 (regarding the economic characteristics of personal data). 
202. See Narciso, supra note 166, at 205. Cf SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF 
SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF 
POWER (2019) ch. 3 fig. 2 (purporting to distinguish between behavioral data 
required for services and “behavioral surplus”). 
203. See, e.g., Timothy Morey et al., Customer Data: Designing for Transparency and 
Trust, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/05/customer-data-
designing-for-transparency-and-trust [https://perma.cc/NL78-46KR]. 
204. See, e.g., In re: WhatsApp, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://www.epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/whatsapp/ 
[https://perma.cc/57LM-WL5V] (regarding the transfer by WhatsApp of its 
users’ personal data to Facebook in 2016); Mike Isaac, Zuckerberg Plans to 
Integrate WhatsApp, Instagram and Facebook Messenger, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/technology/facebook-
instagram-whatsapp-messenger.html [https://perma.cc/XP7D-6E64]. 
205. However, there may be methods to discern the purpose at an earlier point in 
time. See, e.g., Haoyu Wang et al., Understanding the Purpose of Permission Use 
in Mobile Apps, 35 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. SYS., no. 4, 2017, at 43:1. 
206. But see Morey et al., supra note 203 (discussing surveys which indicate that 
consumers tend to see data-for-services transactions as more favorable 
where the data supplied contribute to the service received). 
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make alongside data payments? Ride sharing services, for example, typically 
require consumers to pay both personal data and money. Factoring 
monetary payments into ROD would involve comparing two different forms 
of payment—personal data and money. Computing both of these together 
to produce the ROD score would require a common unit of measurement, 
most likely money, which would involve converting the personal data 
provided by consumers into a specific monetary figure.207 But, as discussed, 
placing a monetary price on data is riddled with difficulties, including due 
to the different subjective value which different people attach to personal 
data.208 While pseudo-calculations of the monetary value of data may create 
a façade of precision and rigor, due to their enormous variance and 
conflicting methodologies they would be unhelpful and even misleading. 
Even if there existed an accepted method for pricing data, it is not clear 
that doing so would actually assist in assessing ROD. Unlike micropayments 
that require placing a monetary price on data (as users are actually paid that 
amount in exchange for supplying data), ROD obviates the need for such 
calculations as it instead evaluates a ratio between two variables, namely (i) 
the benefits consumers receive and (ii) the data price they pay. Its focus is 
the relationship between these two variables—i.e., what a user receives in 
exchange for the data they supply—not translating them into monetary 
terms. Further, ROD does not purport to capture every externality or cost 
imposed on consumers in the context of data-for-services transactions, such 
as downstream data risks, user attention, opportunity costs or, for that 
matter, monetary payments.209 While the concept of ROD could be 
expanded in the future to include these and other factors, stretching it too 
broadly at this stage would undermine its implementation. For now, the 
cost-benefit analysis that ROD facilitates must remain within more 
narrowly-defined parameters. 
The challenges involved in measuring ROD, although shaped by the 
particular characteristics of the services that data-driven companies 
provide to consumers, have an analog in ordinary business accounting—
namely, measuring the value of intangible assets. Techniques used to value 
patents, good will, or human resources are highly subjective and often 
incomplete and costly, especially in the absence of an efficient market that 
 
207. See POSNER & WEYL, supra note 22, at 243 (arguing that monetary pricing is 
necessary to assess the value of data). 
208. See supra note 53 (regarding the difficulty in determining the value of data). 
209. But see WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 3146–58, 3131–35; Solove, supra note 73, at 
1902 (suggesting that privacy law should address the downstream uses of 
data and associated risks, not their initial collection). 
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can price them with greater precision.210 Nevertheless, various proxies are 
routinely employed to determine the value of intangible assets. Accounting 
tools, ranging from cost-based measures to anticipated cash flow, suggest 
that these measuring challenges are not altogether intractable. 
Although ROD may at first glance appear to lack many of the ostensibly 
concrete yardsticks typically used to measure the value of the intangible 
assets that populate company financial statements, a few qualifications are 
in order. First, accounting techniques and the results they render are 
notoriously malleable, yet they continue to be used.211 Second, ROD does 
not seek to price in monetary terms the utility which consumers receive and 
the personal data they provide (as accountants purport to do for intangible 
assets).212 By, instead, comparing the relationship between data provided 
and utility received, ROD is arguably less ambitious than many run-of-the-
mill accounting practices. Third, as will be elaborated, in data-rich contexts 
consumers’ actual engagement with the services they access can be highly 
instructive. The way each individual uses a service can reveal the value of 
the utility she gains and the disutility (if any) she experiences in supplying 
personal data. Fourth, even if the methods of calculating ROD are imperfect, 
the very act of translating the exchange inherent in data-for-services deals 
into a mental model which consumers can understand—ROD—will convey 
to consumers the transactional nature of their relationships with tech firms 
and prompt consumers to treat these arrangements as a quid pro quo.213 
2. Personalized and Dynamic Insight 
The growing literature on the personalization of law supports tailoring 
legal solutions and regulatory tools to the needs, preferences and 
characteristics of individuals.214 ROD is no exception. ROD scores must be 
 
210. Nick Szabo, Measuring Value, SATOSHI NAKAMOTO INST. (1997), 
https://nakamotoinstitute.org/measuring-value [https://perma.cc/U9V6-
96WV]. 
211. Id. This can perhaps be explained by the misalignment of interests that 
plagues the valuations of assets in company financial statements, which are 
not configured for clarity but to satisfy the relevant stakeholders. 
212. See supra note 53 (regarding attempts to assess the value of personal data). 
213. See L. Jean Camp, Mental Models of Privacy and Security, 28 IEEE TECH. & SOC’Y 
37 (2009). 
214 See Busch, supra note 175, at 315–19 (regarding the personalization of consumer 
law), 319–22 (regarding the personalization of data privacy law). See generally Ariel 
Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with 
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unique to each consumer for several reasons. Different consumers typically 
pay different data prices for similar services. A mobile app, for example, may 
collect different types and quantities of data from different users’ devices. 
Consumers also subjectively relate to data collection in different ways. For 
example, some consumers may be more sensitive than others to apps 
accessing a device’s microphone. In addition, the performance, and thus 
utility, of an app may vary across different users’ devices. Consumers also 
value services differently. A particular feature may be important to some 
users but not others. ROD must therefore be personalized and factor in 
these individual, consumer-specific metrics. 
Encoding the more subjective metrics, such as the value that specific 
individuals attach to certain types of personal data or certain features of 
services, will also be challenging. Survey feedback could provide some 
insight into consumers’ experiences. However, analyzing consumers’ actual 
interactions with services and data collection would be far more 
illuminating.215 For example, a consumer’s decision to block apps from 
accessing location data could indicate that the consumer attaches 
significant value to location data. Similarly, a consumer’s frequent use of a 
particular feature of an app could indicate that the consumer prizes that 
feature. But measuring frequency of use can be misleading as the value of 
some features, such as those designed for emergency situations, does not 
necessarily correlate with the frequency with which they are accessed. 
The utility function of ROD, like its corresponding data price, is both 
complex and personal. However, this does not mean that it cannot be 
calculated or at least approximated. Tech firms regularly conduct A/B tests 
that measure users’ responses to different versions of a digital product and 
thereby reveal users’ otherwise hidden subjective experiences and 
preferences. In a similar way, consumers’ interactions with the services 
they access could be used to tacitly elicit their experiences and preferences, 
 
Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417 (2014); Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, 
Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627 (2016); Omri Ben-Shahar & 
Ariel Porat, Personalizing Mandatory Rules in Contract Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 
(2019); Matthew Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Assessing the Empirical Upside 
of Personalized Criminal Procedure, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 489 (2019); Adi Libson & 
Gideon Parchomovsky, Toward the Personalization of Copyright Law, 86 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 527 (2019).  
215. But see Nick Merola, The Satisfaction Trap: Navigating Sentiment Measurement 
for Complex Products, MEDIUM (Dec. 19, 2017), 
https://medium.com/facebook-research/the-satisfaction-trap-
35f94ee9d9d8 [https://perma.cc/7AKY-UBEE] (discussing the emphasis a 
researcher at Facebook placed on the benefits of qualitative testing over 
quantitative measuring in measuring user satisfaction). 
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whether concerning the services themselves or the data consumers supply 
in order to access the services. These insights could then be encoded in 
personalized ROD evaluations. 
One notable challenge to calculating and personalizing ROD scores is 
the need to disaggregate personal data on an individual basis—i.e. for each 
particular user.216 When User X supplies to a platform data relating to User 
Y (who also uses the platform but did not supply such data), who is deemed 
to supply the data in question? The data relate to User Y, but it is User X who 
supplied them. A corresponding issue affects the utility which users receive: 
User X may, whether directly or indirectly, benefit from the utility received 
by User Y. For the purpose of calculating ROD, should that utility be credited 
toward User X’s utility or User Y’s utility? This line of questioning is vital to 
unpacking precisely which personal data and what utility will be credited 
toward a particular individual’s ROD score. To simplify the initial 
implementation of ROD, it would probably be prudent to calculate a user’s 
data payment by reference only to the data that the user herself supplies 
and to calculate the corresponding utility by reference only to the utility that 
she herself receives, rather than by attempting to quantify the network 
effects and other positive externalities generated by other users. 
Importantly, ROD varies not only across different individuals, but also 
over time. The scope of data collection and the utility of services are not 
fixed.217 For example, an app may alter the scope of data it collects; a 
consumer may adjust an app’s data collection permissions; an app’s features 
may evolve; its performance may fluctuate; a consumer may change the way 
in which she uses an app and the value she attaches to its features or 
different types of personal data. Therefore, data price and utility cannot be 
fully computed in advance. The calculations which produce ROD scores 
must therefore be dynamic.218 
Assessing ROD in real time is likely to require employing different 
metrics at different points in time. The initial ROD evaluation of a mobile 
app (upon installation or before it has been used) will need to rely on more 
generic, non-personal metrics, as the information required to produce 
personalized evaluations can only be sourced from a user’s actual 
 
216. This issue may turn on the legal question of who owns or holds rights in the 
data. See Victor, supra note 19. 
217. See WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 3213–16. 
218. Cf. id. at 5349–52 (arguing that frequent updates to the ROD metrics would 
make it difficult for consumers to conduct meaningful comparisons between 
different service providers.) 
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interaction with the app.219 An app’s default data permissions could be 
instructive, as could the average ROD of other users of the app. In addition, 
a user’s interactions with other apps could shine light on the types of 
personal data and services she values, which would help predict the 
expected data price and utility of the app for that particular user. By 
contrast, later ROD evaluations (after the user has interacted with the app) 
could employ more personal metrics, based on a user’s actual interaction 
with the app—including the scope of data collection actually occurring, app 
performance, and the user’s engagement with different features of the app. 
Just as ROD evaluations will need to be dynamic and employ different 
metrics at different times, the conceptual framework of ROD will also need 
to adapt to changing circumstances. The implementation of ROD must be an 
iterative process. The methods for personalizing ROD scores and 
disaggregating personal data and utility among different users will need to 
be refined over time. As data practices evolve, the principles for gauging the 
relationship between the data consumers supply and the services they 
receive will themselves need to change with time220 
3. It Takes Data to Evaluate ROD 
Calculating ROD will be a data-intensive process. Information regarding 
both data collection and consumer behavior will be necessary to gain insight 
into data-for-services transactions. Consumers will need to supply an 
ongoing stream of personal data in order to receive dynamic, personalized 
ROD evaluations. Weigend calls this the “Give to Get” philosophy: “If you 
want your decision-making to be improved by data, you usually have to 
agree to having your data collected . . . .”221 As is the case for privacy tech 
 
219. See generally Xuan Nhat Lam et al., Addressing Cold-Start Problem in 
Recommendation Systems, 2 PROC. INT’L CONF. ON UBIQUITOUS INFO. MGMT. & 
COMM. 208 (2008); Blerina Lika et al., Facing the Cold Start Problem in 
Recommender Systems, 41 EXPERT SYS. APPLICATIONS 2065 (2014); Andrew I. 
Schein et al., Methods and Metrics for Cold-Start Recommendations, 25 PROC. 
ACM SPECIAL INT. GROUP ON INFO. RETRIEVAL CONF. ON RES. & DEV. INFO. RETRIEVAL 
253 (2002). 
220. See WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 3234–3237; see also Strandburg, supra note 26, 
at 145. 
221. WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 229–236; see also id. at 145. In addition, the title of 
Weigend’s book is “Data for the People” (emphasis added). See also Busch, 
supra note [175], at 326; David A. Hoffman & Patricia A. Rimo, It Takes Data 
to Protect Data, in PRIVACY HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 546; DATAWALLET, 
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and other personalized services and regulatory tools, data collection is a 
pre-requisite for generating ROD evaluations. It is the price of making data-
for-services transactions more transparent. 
Many data points are required to measure the data consumers supply 
and the utility they gain in data-for-services transactions. In the context of 
mobile ecosystems, an app’s privacy policy, its data permissions, and the 
applicable regulatory framework may be informative. But these only reflect 
the potential scope of data collection. Assessing the actual scope of data 
collection relies on monitoring an app’s outbound data.222 Clearly, 
measuring only the quantity of data collected is inadequate. The type and 
quality of data matter. For example, Social Security numbers and private 
Bitcoin keys are highly sensitive and valuable despite their small size. 
Several of these data points are contained in the communications 
between a mobile app and the device’s operating system. Whenever an app 
seeks to access data from the device (e.g., location data, camera access), it 
must send an API request to the operating system.223 For example, Skype 
sends an API request to access the device’s microphone. The operating 
system then responds by delivering the requested data. Given that 
operating systems receive all API requests made by apps, they can closely 
monitor the data collection carried out by different apps.224 In the case of 
Skype, for example, this would include the length of calls and associated 
metadata. Apple and Google, the proprietors of the iOS and Android 
operating systems, have full access to these APIs. For the time being, they 
hold the keys to monitoring the data consumers share with mobile apps. 
Mobile apps owned by Google and Apple, such as Google Calendar and 
Apple Music, complicate ROD evaluations.225 As explained, Google and 
Apple can, via API requests, indirectly access most data collected by mobile 
 
https://app.datawallet.com/ [https://perma.cc/E8KK-KJWE] (for a 
commercial application of this philosophy). 
222. The encryption and compression of outbound data may pose additional 
challenges. 
223. See generally Jenn Chen, What Is an API & Why Does It Matter?, SPROUT SOC. 
(Jan. 31, 2018), https://sproutsocial.com/insights/what-is-an-api/ 
[https://perma.cc/C2FM-2JY8]. 
224. But operating systems may find it difficult to monitor passive data collection, 
such as data relating to a user sourced from the activities of others. See supra 
note 60 (regarding passive data collection). 
225. 23 of the 25 most-downloaded Android apps are owned by either Google or 
Facebook. See Android Market History Data and Ranklists, ANDROIDRANK, 
https://www.androidrank.org/ [https://perma.cc/8ZRP-F23N]. 
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apps, including third party apps. Accordingly, monitoring the API requests 
sent by Google Calendar to Android (Google’s own operating system) would 
not be instructive. That Google Calendar may, for example, collect location 
data is uninformative; Google already can, and perhaps already does, collect 
location data via the Android operating system or other Google apps, such 
as Google Maps. Seen in this light, users’ data-for-services transactions 
involving apps owned by Google and Apple are part of much larger 
transactions with Google and Apple.226 Consumers do not share specific 
data with Google in exchange for using Google Calendar. Google already 
collects data from consumers in various contexts and, in return, provides 
them with a wide array of services. To overcome this issue, ROD may need 
to be evaluated in relation to the proprietor of each app, rather than in 
relation to the app itself.227 
Just as many data points are needed to assess the data price that 
consumers pay, so too are many data points needed to assess the utility that 
consumers gain. Exploring the best proxies for consumer utility and 
deciding what weight to place on each of them will be challenging. A 
significant number of the services that tech firms provide are “experience 
goods” or “credence goods,” the quality of which is difficult for consumers 
to evaluate, even post-fact.228 Consumer ratings of apps, app popularity and 
comparisons with competing apps may shed light on an app’s utility.229 
 
226. A similar issue complicates ROD evaluations of apps owned by Facebook (e.g., 
WhatsApp and Instagram) and Microsoft (e.g., Skype and LinkedIn). See also 
Isaac, supra note 204 (regarding Facebook’s plans to consolidate the 
infrastructure of the various platforms which it owns). 
227. The per-app approach may also be problematic as most data are accessed 
through third party libraries which function across multiple apps. See 
Saksham Chitkara et al., Does this App Really Need My Location? Context-Aware 
Privacy Management for Smartphones, 1 ACM INTERACTIVE MOBILE WEARABLE & 
UBIQUITOUS TECH., no. 3, 2017, at 42:1. Further, given that the infrastructure of 
certain tech firms (especially Google) is ubiquitous and the utility they 
provide spans many applications, the per-proprietor approach may also be 
problematic. 
228. See Strandburg, supra note 26, at 131–32. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 
(1963); Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, On Doctors, Mechanics, and 
Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 5 
(2006) (discussing how vendors can use information asymmetries to 
overcharge consumers). 
229. Some of these already feature in Google Play, Apple’s App Store and third-
party comparison sites. See e.g., Snapchat vs. WhatsApp, VERSUS, 
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Technical metrics, such as app performance, and personal metrics, such as 
frequency of use, are also informative.230 As explained, the most 
illuminating insights into the benefits consumers receive will be gleaned 
from analyzing their actual interactions with services. Consider, for 
example, a navigation app that collects the equivalent data from two 
different users but where only one of those users takes advantage of the 
app’s real-time traffic updates to alter their chosen route. All else being 
equal, the user who utilizes the real-time traffic updates will receive greater 
utility from the app, which will translate into the app delivering to them 
higher ROD than to the other user. 
More subjective metrics, such as an individual’s personal assessment of 
an app’s features, could also be employed. But subjective metrics, whether 
relating to utility or data price, are difficult to quantify and encode.231 How 
can one measure the value of forging a new relationship via a dating app or 
finding a dream job on LinkedIn?232 How can one calculate an individual’s 
personal sensitivity to certain types of data collection? Answering these 
questions—which touch upon some of the fundamental issues facing the 
growing personalization of law and policy233—is beyond the scope of this 
article. Nevertheless, to holistically reflect the data price consumers supply 
and the utility they gain, ROD evaluations will need to factor in certain 
subjective metrics, as elicited from the best available information on 
consumers’ interactions with the services they use. Capturing these subtle 
insights is likely to require further access to personal data. 
4. Assessing Comparable Transactions 
ROD evaluations will, at least initially, only be helpful in assessing 




230. See WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 3181–84. But simple measurements of screen 
time and data consumption are poor indicators of utility. While watching 
Netflix may consume large quantities of data and involve lengthy screen time, 
its utility is not necessarily greater than that of an email client. More 
importantly, video streaming and email clients provide very different types of 
utility. See infra Section V.A.4. 
231. See WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 3140, 3176–79. 
232. Id. at 2911–16. 
233 See generally Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, A Framework for the New 
Personalization of Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 86 (2019). See also infra note 214. 
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in data-for-services transactions—from Microsoft’s LinkedIn to Amazon’s 
Alexa—is vast. Different mobile apps, for instance, perform very different 
functions. Dropbox stores files in the cloud. Fitbit provides health and 
exercise insights. Instagram connects people through shared media. 
Comparing the utility a consumer gains from one of these apps with another 
would not be instructive.234 Apart from the nature of the services provided, 
data-for-services transactions that share in common other features may 
also lend themselves to ROD evaluations. For instance, services delivered in 
similar contexts (e.g., in-car apps) or to similar demographics (e.g., small 
business owners) may also be suitable use cases. 
The key is to compare like with like. This will be easiest where the utility 
of the product is similar. For example, Skype, LINE and Viber all provide 
similar services, namely, voice and video calls. Therefore, comparing their 
respective sound and image quality, connection reliability, and user 
experience would be helpful. In each category of mobile apps competing 
apps offer similar services—music (e.g., Spotify and SoundCloud), podcasts 
(e.g., Stitcher and Podbean), storage (e.g., Dropbox and OneDrive), 
productivity (e.g., Quick PDF Scanner and CamScanner), and photo sharing 
(e.g., Flickr and Imgur).235 There are also competing voice assistants—
Alexa, Siri, and Google Assistant. Products and services in each of these 
categories are ripe for ROD evaluation. 
Going forward, additional use cases are likely to emerge as new 
categories of apps and IoT devices are developed for smart homes and 
smart cities. In the meantime, there is certainly no shortage of opportunities 
for deploying ROD. Comparable mobile apps and voice assistants are prime 
candidates for quantifying utility and measuring the type and quantity of 
data collection. It is these ROD evaluations, which assess the utility and data 
price of similar services, which are most likely to draw consumer 
 
234. Even apps which provide ostensibly similar services are not necessarily 
comparable, often because of their respective network effects. Consider social 
networking and other relationship apps, such as Tinder and Bumble, whose 
utility is intimately related to the groups of people they capture and create. 
See, e.g., Case M.8124, Microsoft / LinkedIn, 2016 E.C. 139/2004 ¶ 341 (Dec. 
6, 2016), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m8124_1349_5.
pdf [https://perma.cc/XP73-MJSD] (regarding the benefits of network 
effects); Rise of Data Capital, supra note 54, at 7 (differentiating between 
direct and indirect network effects). 
235. Mobile payments apps, health and lifestyle services and ride sharing may also 
provide similar services, however many of these also involve monetary 
payments. See supra Section V.A.1. 
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attention.236 They will reveal which services within a given category provide 
the highest utility-to-data price ratio, enabling consumers to comparison-
shop and make informed decisions when choosing between competing 
service providers. 
B. Nudging Return on Data 
Assessing ROD will not on its own enable consumers to navigate the 
tradeoffs inherent in data-for-services transactions. ROD scores must be 
actively communicated to consumers. As explained, consumers do not 
presently experience the transactional nature of their relationships with 
tech firms. Only if ROD is salient, will consumers tangibly experience the 
exchange underlying these transactions and, in turn, incorporate ROD into 
their decision-making. 
Like with any transparency-enhancing technology, simplicity is key.237 
The average consumer should receive only the most essential ROD 
information. A clear snapshot of the data a consumer supplies to a service 
provider and the utility she receives in return will relieve her of the burden 
of conducting overly complex analysis and the associated cognitive 
overhead.238 By providing palatable information, ROD will serve as a choice 
 
236. See Xia et al., supra note 91, at 3–4 (explaining that consumers tend to pay 
greater attention to price discrepancies between similar products). 
237. See generally Urs Gasser, Recoding Privacy Law: Reflections on the Future 
Relationship Among Law, Technology, and Privacy, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 61, 65 
(2016); Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1409, 1414 (2011); Christian Zimmermann, A Categorization of Transparency-
Enhancing Technologies, AMSTERDAM PRIVACY CONF. 2015 (revised July 22, 
2015), https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.04914 [https://perma.cc/DC7F-HUQY]. 
238. POSNER & WEYL, supra note 22, at 244–45. However, as consumers do not 
currently dedicate time or resources to deliberating over data-for-services 
transactions, the introduction of ROD may actually impose on consumers new 
costs or “decision fatigue.” See generally Kathleen D. Vohs et al., Making 
Choices Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: A Limited-Resource Account of 
Decision Making, Self-Regulation, and Active Initiative, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. 883, 895–96 (2008); Jonathan Levav et al., Order in Product 
Customization Decisions: Evidence from Field Experiments, 118 J. POL. ECON. 
274, 296 (2010). But unlike in the case of micropayments, the imposition of 
transaction costs under ROD—much like the costs of developing the systems 
and infrastructure necessary to facilitate ROD—will be worthwhile as 
consumers will, it is hoped, ultimately receive greater utility in the form of 
better services.  
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engine encouraging consumers to reflect on the data prices they pay for the 
services they receive.239 Consumers will be able to consider the merits of 
each data-for-services deal and make more deliberative decisions on how 
to spend the personal data they generate.240 
Visualizing ROD could be particularly helpful in guiding consumers. 
Currently, several browsers employ visual symbols to communicate to 
users the security status of different websites.241 Google Chrome, for 
example, uses different symbols to flag whether a website is secure, 
unsecure, or highly unsecure.242 A similar interface could communicate 
ROD. A sliding scale (or traffic light system) could color-code transactions 
according to their ROD—green for high ROD, amber for intermediate ROD, 
and red for low ROD.243 A red light might, for example, be displayed where 
a VOIP mobile app continuously collects audio and visual data even when 
no call is in session and provides poorer quality calls than other VOIP apps. 
Meanwhile, a green light might be displayed where a VOIP app collects 
smaller quantities of sensitive data but still provides high fidelity calls. 
Apple’s App Store and Google Play could then display the respective ROD 
scores in each app’s profile, which would feature alongside other 
information, such as an app’s rating and popularity. Alternatively, ROD 
scores could be displayed in the settings portals of a mobile operating 
system or as pop-ups within apps.244 
 
239. See generally Richard H. Thaler & Will Tucker, Smarter Information, Smarter 
Consumers, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.–Feb. 2013), 
https://hbr.org/2013/01/smarter-information-smarter-consumers 
[https://perma.cc/7GSR-NQ92]. 
240. See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 77. 
241. Adrienne Porter Felt et al., Rethinking Connection Security Indicators, 12 PROC. 
SOUPS 1 (2016); What is an SSL Certificate?, DIGICERT SYMANTEC, 
https://www.websecurity.digicert.com/security-topics/what-is-ssl-tls-
https?id=ssl-information-center# [https://perma.cc/NLH6-TN8N]. 
242. Check If a Site’s Connection Is Secure, GOOGLE CHROME HELP, 
https://support.google.com/chrome/?p=ui_security_indicator 
[https://perma.cc/927J-WB2E]. 
243. See WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 3221–29 (likening the ROD scale to energy-
efficiency ratings of appliances); KPMG, supra note 82, at 19. 
244. See Rebecca Balebako et al., The Impact of Timing on the Salience of 
Smartphone App Privacy Notices, 5 PROC. ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. 
SECURITY WORKSHOP ON SECURITY & PRIVACY IN SMARTPHONES & MOBILE DEVICES 63 
(2015) (suggesting that consumers may pay greater attention to information 
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Importantly, personalized ROD dashboards, tailored to the needs, 
desires and characteristics of different consumers, would be more effective 
than a one-size-fits-all ROD interface.245 For instance, some consumers may 
want more granular ROD insights. They may wish to understand the 
principles according to which ROD operates as well as the specific data 
points and metrics that ROD encodes. Customized user interfaces should be 
developed to convey this information.246 In addition, the mechanics of ROD 
evaluations must themselves be transparent. Without disclosing the ROD 
algorithm, those conducting ROD evaluations could not be held 
accountable.247 But the more transparent the ROD algorithm, the higher the 
chances that companies will successfully game it and configure services to 
have artificially high ROD scores.248 
Making ROD salient in these ways and enabling consumers to 
experience the tradeoffs that characterize their relationships with data-
driven companies could have a significant impact on consumers’ decisions. 
Behavioral studies demonstrate that consumers do not make decisions in a 
vacuum. They are affected by a variety of factors, including default options, 
 
provided within an app, compared with information available on an app 
store). 
245 See, e.g, Personalised Nudging for more Data Disclosure? On the Adaption of Data Usage 
Policies Format to Cognitive Styles (2019), 
https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/59877/1/0437.pdf; Personalized 
Security Messaging: Nudges for Compliance with Browser Warnings (2017) 
https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/eurousec2017_08_Malkin_paper.pdf!. 
246. See, e.g., GHOSTERY, https://www.ghostery.com/ [https://perma.cc/A3LQ-
Q264] (displaying both simple and detailed dashboards). These could be 
similar to “Schumer boxes,” which outline to consumers the key terms of 
credit card agreements. See Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-583, § 2, 102 Stat. 2960 (1988); Hosea H. Harvey, 
Opening Schumer’s Box: The Empirical Foundations of Modern Consumer 
Finance Disclosure Law, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 59, 60 (2014). 
247. See generally PASQUALE, supra note 186, at ch. 5; Christian Sandvig et al., 
Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for Detecting Discrimination on 
Internet Platforms, in 64 MEETING INT’L COMM. ASSOC. 1 (2014). 
248. See JERRY MULLER, THE TYRANNY OF METRICS 3, 24, 77, 149 (2018); Hacker & 
Petkova, supra note 180, at 17; see also POSNER & WEYL, supra note 22, at 238 
(discussing a Microsoft experiment in which a personal data payment system 
was exploited by rogue bots). 
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status quo bias, and the information presented to or withheld from them.249 
The shaping of these factors is known as choice architecture.250 Acquisti 
observes that: 
[E]very design decision behind the construction of every online 
(e.g., software, online social networks, online blogs, mobile devices 
and applications, etc.) or offline (e.g., conference rooms, vehicles, 
food menus, etc.) system or tool we use has the potential to 
influence users’ behaviors, regardless of whether the designer, or 
the user, is fully aware of those influences and their consequences. 
In simple terms, there is no such thing as a neutral design in privacy, 
security, or anywhere else.251 
Put differently, every design choice is a nudge. Sunstein and Thaler 
define a nudge as any policy intervention designed to “alter[] people’s 
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or 
significantly changing their economic incentives.”252 With the assistance of 
behavioral insights, choice architecture could be used to nudge consumers’ 
decisions relating to personal data.253 
 
249. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 3; Richard H. Thaler et al., Choice 
Architecture (Working Paper, 2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1583509 [https://perma.cc/99CK-GHW5]. 
250. Id.  
251. Acquisti et al., supra note 72, at 32–33; see also Idris Adjerid et al., Choice 
Architecture, Framing, and Cascaded Privacy Choices, 65 MANAG. SCI. 2267 
(2018); Ron Hirschprung et al., Analyzing and Optimizing Access Control 
Choice Architectures in Online Social Networks, 8 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON 
INTELLIGENT SYST.  & TECH., no. 4, 2017, at 57:1. 
252. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 6; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Richard 
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein 
& Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1159 (2003). 
253. See Serge Egelman et al., Choice Architecture and Smartphone Privacy: There’s 
a Price for That, 2012 WORKSHOP ON ECON. INFO. SECURITY 211 (discussing a study 
in which individuals were more willing to pay a premium for privacy friendly 
mobile apps where a selection of less privacy friendly apps was also made 
available.) 
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In recent years, several economists and computer scientists have 
proposed techniques for nudging consumers to protect their privacy.254 
They suggest that disclosing privacy risks will mitigate consumers’ 
tendency to overlook and underestimate these risks.255 Where the risks are 
salient, consumers are more likely to take them seriously. In addition, 
framing privacy risks as costs or burdens will appeal to consumers’ 
reluctance to bear losses and, thereby, encourage them to better protect 
personal data relating to them.256 However, these choice architecture 
proposals relate only to privacy.257 They do not advocate comparing the 
data consumers supply with the utility they gain. Nor do these proposals 
seek to disclose ROD or prompt consumers to demand better deals from 
service providers. Like most of the legal frameworks and data platforms 
that have been discussed, choice architecture relating to personal data is 
also preoccupied with privacy. This need not be the case. Choice architects 
can nudge ROD. 
Communicating ROD evaluations to consumers would frame their 
interactions with tech firms as a genuine exchange. If data-for-services deals 
were transparent, consumers would realize that the services they consume 
are not free but paid for with personal data. Nudging ROD in this way could 
tackle, and even harness, several cognitive and behavioral biases. If the data 
price were disclosed upfront, consumers would be less likely to overlook 
the longer-term costs of trading personal data. Upon seeing data collection 
as a price, consumers may become more selective in deciding which 
transactions to enter.258 Although displaying ROD cannot guarantee that 
 
254. See, e.g., Hazim Almuhimedi et al., Your Location Has Been Shared 5398 Times! 
A Field Study on Mobile Privacy Nudges, 33 PROC. COMPUTER HUM. INTERACTION 
CONF. ON HUMAN FACTORS COMPUTING SYS. 787 (2015). 
255. See Acquisti et al., supra note 72, at 13–14 (explaining how disclosing 
information about these risks may overcome the availability and 
overconfidence biases). 
256. See id. at 17. 
257. However, some tech firms have begun to use nudges for other purposes. See, 
e.g., Heather Schwedel, Gmail’s New Nudge Feature Is a More Efficient Way to 




258. Yet, it need not altogether deter them from using data-driven services. See, 
e.g., SALESFORCE, supra note 98, at 9 (indicating that consumers demand both 
personalized services and transparency around the use of personal data). 
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consumers will focus on the utility-to-data ratio of their exchanges with tech 
firms, it will at the very least equip consumers with a GPS-like tool to 
navigate the complex tradeoffs inherent in data-for-services 
transactions.259 ROD would thus empower consumers and reduce their 
information asymmetry vis-à-vis tech firms. 
ROD nudges could employ different degrees of forcefulness. A soft 
nudge might only provide information. For example, by simultaneously 
displaying the ROD of comparable mobile apps, app stores could nudge 
consumers toward selecting apps with higher ROD.260 This would not 
impact consumers’ ability to access apps with lower ROD. Meanwhile, a 
more robust nudge could, for example, engineer the search results in an app 
store to give priority to apps with higher ROD. This nudge would be more 
forceful as it would significantly alter the choices presented to consumers. 
It might even border on a shove.261 Yet, it would still not impose a particular 
choice. A consumer could nonetheless, after a longer search, opt for an app 
with lower ROD.262 ROD nudges, by definition, leave consumers free to 
choose for themselves which services to purchase with the personal data 
they generate.263 Nudging ROD would merely enable consumers to engage 
in a cost-benefit analysis and weigh the pros and cons of each transaction. 
C. Pathways to Adopting Return on Data 
There are several potential routes to introducing ROD. Some involve 
mandatory regulation while others involve voluntary adoption by industry 
actors. To begin with, existing legal frameworks could be amended to 
 
259. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ON FREEDOM (2019). 
260. See Serge Egelman et al., 2009 Timing Is Everything?: The Effects of Timing and 
Placement of Online Privacy Indicators, PROC.  COMPUTER HUM. INTERACTION CONF. 
ON HUMAN FACTORS COMPUTING SYS. 319 (explaining that nudges are most 
effective when introduced prior to consumers committing to particular 
choices). 
261. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 6 (“Putting fruit at eye level counts as 
a nudge. Banning junk food does not.”); Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard 
Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000). 
262. A consumer may do this because she trusts the app developer. See generally 
Morey et al., supra note 203 (explaining that consumers supply to companies 
they consider trustworthy more valuable data in exchange for comparable 
services). 
263. See Acquisti et al., supra note 86, at 509–10; Adjerid et al., supra note 251, at 
43. 
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incorporate ROD. For instance, the GDPR could institute the principle, 
already enshrined in the EU Directive, that personal data are the price 
consumers pay for many services. The rights of data subjects under the 
GDPR and other privacy law regimes, such as the CCPA, could be expanded 
to require that service providers monitor and disclose ROD to consumers. 
Mobile operating systems might, for example, be required to assess and 
communicate the ROD of third-party apps to consumers. Meanwhile, 
existing data protection authorities could oversee and enforce ROD 
regulation. 
Alternatively, new legal frameworks could be developed to specifically 
institute and regulate ROD. Such frameworks might be more ambitious in 
their goals and methods. They could, for instance, mandate a minimum ROD 
in certain contexts, such as for particular types of platforms or for 
consumers with specific vulnerabilities. A specialized agency could be 
established to set standards for ROD and audit the ROD evaluations carried 
out by tech firms.264 
Mandatory ROD regulation, whether in the form of amendments to 
existing legal frameworks or the establishment of new legal frameworks, 
may have many advantages. As an educational device,265 ROD regulation 
could cultivate greater understanding of our interactions with service 
providers, much like the GDPR has increased awareness of privacy 
concerns. It could also jump-start the deployment of ROD nudges by 
mandating that service providers or intermediaries, such as app stores and 
operating systems, make ROD salient.266 Thus, if properly designed and 
enforced, ROD regulation could ensure greater transparency around data-
for-services transactions. The associated public scrutiny of such 
transactions might, in turn, drive companies to rethink the relationship 
between the personal data they collect and the services they provide, and 
even recalibrate the kind of deals they offer consumers. 
However, some of these assumptions are tenuous. Apart from the likely 
political impediments to adopting ROD regulation, there is no guarantee 
that such regulation will successfully educate the public or meaningfully 
impact consumer behavior. It will be challenging to effect a paradigm shift 
toward ROD, especially given the entrenchment of the existing privacy-
 
264. See WEIGEND, supra note 3, at 3221–3229. 
265. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, HOW CHANGE HAPPENS 46 (2019) (regarding the expressive 
function of law in signaling social norms). 
266. See, e.g., Thaler & Tucker, supra note 239. 
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centric perspectives among companies and consumers alike.267 In addition, 
it is notoriously difficult to regulate a moving target. Due to the complex and 
dynamic nature of the transactions that ROD seeks to evaluate, there is no 
straightforward way to craft legislation that properly captures and 
implements the principles of ROD and ensures the necessary 
transparency—let alone enforcement. 
ROD regulation could also have unintended consequences. By 
demanding that companies comply with onerous requirements, such as 
ROD monitoring and disclosure, mandatory regulation could impose 
burdensome costs that stifle the technological innovation, risk-taking and 
investment that drive the data economy.268 As mandatory regulation would 
not incentivize companies to embrace ROD but compel them to do so, 
companies’ implementation of ROD would not necessarily align with their 
business interests. Companies would likely attempt to implement ROD as 
cheaply as possible, the outcome of which may be sub-optimal and even 
defeat the purposes of ROD. Ironically, mandatory regulation may also favor 
industry incumbents and disadvantage smaller companies with fewer 
resources available to absorb ROD compliance costs.269 
 
267. See generally S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990) (discussing the QWERTY keyboard, an archetypal case of 
path dependence); S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, 
Lock-in, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995). 
268. See, e.g., Privacy Rights and Data Collection in a Digital Economy: Hearing 
before the S. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Development, 116th 
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Jian Jia et al., The Short-Run Effects of GDPR on Technology Venture Investment 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 25248, 2019), 
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(2014). 
269. See Cegłowski, supra note 268; Leonid Bershidsky, Europe’s Privacy Rules Are 
Having Unintended Consequences, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-14/facebook-and-
google-aren-t-hurt-by-gdpr-but-smaller-firms-are [https://perma.cc/8FRP-
FQP5]; Elizabeth Schulze, Mark Zuckerberg Says He Wants Stricter European-
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(Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/01/facebook-ceo-
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[https://perma.cc/LNQ5-5DGQ]. 
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One alternative to mandatory regulation is self-regulation. Rather than 
mandate particular courses of action, self-regulation relies on companies 
voluntarily pursuing pro-social policies.270 Under this approach, companies 
could themselves decide whether and how to assess ROD and engage 
consumers. Although self-regulation generally has several 
shortcomings271—including a lack of independence and external oversight, 
intrinsic conflicts of interest, and vulnerability to abuse—it also has distinct 
advantages. Under ROD self-regulation, service providers would not be 
burdened by external regulatory costs and additional barriers to entry, but 
would be given the opportunity to experiment with different approaches to 
ROD. The implementation of ROD in this context is likely to be more 
adaptive to changing user patterns and dynamic data-for-services business 
models. Instead of being constrained by regulatory standards, companies 
could design and deploy ROD mechanisms which align with their business 
vision and commercial interests. 
But, in the absence of mandatory regulation, why would tech firms 
volunteer to make data-for-services transactions more transparent? Why 
would they choose to subject their businesses to unnecessary scrutiny and 
threaten the highly profitable status quo?272 As a matter of fact, several 
major tech firms have publicly called for greater regulation of personal 
data.273 If these companies are willing to support the imposition of 
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mandatory regulation that would force them to substantially alter their 
businesses, surely they would be willing to contemplate voluntarily 
adopting codes of conduct and practices that they can themselves design 
and implement.274 
Tech firms are also facing a crisis of confidence, particularly in the wake 
of numerous high-profile privacy scandals.275 They therefore want to be 
seen as proactively tackling concerns relating to personal data,276 as norm 
entrepreneurs at the cutting edge of data policy.277 Although public 
attention is largely focused on privacy protection, the notion that 
consumers deserve to receive more in return for the personal data they 
supply is gaining traction. If major tech firms were to self-regulate, they 
could improve their tarnished reputations and bolster trust among current 
and prospective customers.278 And, the more companies that implement 
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ROD, the stronger the ROD norm cascade, and the greater the reputational 
incentives for other companies to adopt ROD as well.279 
ROD self-regulation may involve both technological and legal measures. 
Companies could develop tools to conduct ROD evaluations that they would 
communicate to customers. Companies could also more explicitly disclose 
that customers pay for services with personal data. For example, terms of 
service could grant customers a contractual right to know the ROD of a given 
service, even prior to accessing the service. 
Another way to implement ROD is via a third-party organization that 
would monitor and publicize the ROD scores of different services.280 There 
is a robust precedent for such a model: Net Promoter Scores (or NPS). NPS 
is a measure of customer satisfaction based on simple consumer surveys.281 
Although the derivation of NPS scores is controversial, NPS has been 
embraced by management across many industries, often as a predictor of 
growth, and plays an important role in the decision-making of many S&P 
500 companies.282 If a third-party company or industry watchdog were to 
track the ROD scores of competing services (generalized from the ROD of 
individual users) and consumers began to employ ROD in deciding which 
services to use, companies would turn to ROD as a proxy for customer 
satisfaction and even as a predictor of growth. Like NPS scores, ROD scores 
would enter boardrooms and impact the decision-making of major tech 
firms. 
If consumers embraced ROD, data prices would over time become more 
elastic and better correlate with the utility of the services provided. Data 
collection would no longer be a flat fee that all consumers pay irrespective 
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the “take” in data-for-services transactions would be better aligned. Tech 
firms would become accountable to consumers as they could no longer 
charge arbitrary data prices with impunity. Service providers would suffer 
adverse consequences if they unilaterally increased the data price without 
increasing the corresponding utility that consumers receive.  
Put differently, as ROD becomes more prevalent, customer satisfaction 
and customer retention would increasingly hinge on ROD. In order to retain 
and attract ROD-sensitive consumers, service providers would have an 
incentive to carefully calibrate the scope of data collection they carry out. 
These developments would eliminate the moral hazard by which companies 
currently extract personal data at little or no cost (in terms of customer 
satisfaction and retention) and thereby correct the market failure that 
currently affects most data-for-services deals. 
Ultimately, the more broadly ROD is adopted, the more ROD will 
interest consumers, as paying a higher data price—whether in terms of the 
quantity or quality of data—will actually buy them better services. The 
purchasing power of personal data will increase. By deciding which services 
to use based on ROD, consumers will signal their preferences to service 
providers, namely, lower data prices and higher-quality services. A critical 
mass of ROD-sensitive consumers demanding greater ROD will drive 
companies to respond by offering consumers greater ROD.283 Companies 
will thus need to pay close attention to the ROD they offer consumers, as 
well as the relationship between the data collection they perform and the 
services they provide. 
Once several major tech firms are onboard, others will have to follow or 
risk losing business. A competitive market will emerge. Companies will have 
an incentive to increase the ROD they offer consumers and will need to 
compete with one another to attract the business of consumers seeking 
higher ROD. By evaluating and communicating the ROD of competing 
services, third-parties and intermediaries (such as app stores and operating 
systems) will further stimulate this ROD-driven market. And, the more 
transparent and accessible ROD scores become, the more the market will 
thrive. 
The introduction of ROD also presents exciting opportunities for 
startups. New market entrants, by offering consumers superior data-for-
services deals, could draw business away from the tech giants.284 
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Companies that are early to adopt ROD will have a first-mover advantage. 
Consumers, aware of the transactional value of personal data, will be more 
inclined to share valuable data with companies offering more attractive 
ROD deals.285 And the more consumers take interest in ROD, the steeper the 
ROD adoption curve among service providers. Startups that offer greater 
ROD will receive higher-quality and more relevant data from consumers, 
which will give them an edge over larger rivals. In particular, it will assist 
startups in performing consumer and product analytics and in developing 
and training AI.286 ROD-driven competition could in the long run disperse 
market power among different service providers.287 Entrepreneurs 
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attentive to emerging ROD norms and consumer expectations may have the 
potential to challenge the dominance of the Big Tech incumbents.288 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to advocate a new paradigm for analyzing data-
for-services transactions. As we debate the future of data law and policy, 
including the introduction of federal privacy legislation, it is increasingly 
clear that privacy is not the only issue at stake. We must also consider what 
consumers receive in exchange for the data they share—that is, consumers’ 
return on data (ROD). Most legal frameworks and many data platforms 
remain preoccupied with privacy and continue to overlook the 
transactional model that characterizes businesses in the data economy. This 
Article aims to buck that trend and challenge the reigning privacy paradigm. 
By proposing principles for assessing the relationship between the data 
consumers supply and the utility they receive, this Article seeks to grapple 
with the exchange that underpins data-for-services transactions. 
To make data-for-services transactions more transparent, we need both 
to refine the methods for conducting personalized ROD evaluations and to 
effectively communicate the results to individual consumers. Consumers 
must understand and experience the transactional nature of their 
relationships with data-driven service providers. Showcasing the ROD 
scores of competing services will enable consumers to become conscious of 
the tradeoffs they routinely make. Equipped with a choice engine to better 
navigate the range of data-for-services deals on offer, consumers will be 
able to make more informed decisions regarding which deals to accept, and 
which to reject. 
The implementation of ROD, like proposals for personalizing other 
areas of the law, clearly warrants further investigation. Who will develop 
and deploy practical tools for assessing ROD—government, startups, or 
major tech firms? Should regulation be introduced to jump-start or oversee 
the process? How can we mitigate the risk of ROD evaluations being 
manipulated or gamed? Notwithstanding these important questions, we can 
assume that if consumers begin to factor ROD into their decision-making at 
scale, service providers will need to respond. If consumers decide which 
 
288. See generally FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF 
BIG TECH (2017); TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 
(2018); ZUBOFF, supra note 202; Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 
YALE L.J. 710 (2016); Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 
119 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2019). 
RETURN ON DATA  
 149 
services to use even partly on the basis of ROD, market forces will 
incentivize tech firms to increase the ROD they offer. To compete for the 
business of ROD-sensitive consumers, service providers will need to reduce 
the scope of data collection and improve the quality of services. 
Looking forward, emerging technologies are expected to increase the 
size, complexity, and accuracy of our data footprints. Although data-for-
services transactions are unlikely to disappear in the near future, 
personalized legal frameworks and regulatory tools may herald new 
approaches. Consumers may begin to question the often arbitrary 
relationship between the personal data they supply and the services they 
receive. While it is difficult to envisage exactly how consumers and 
companies will engage with ROD, now is the time to reflect on the 
possibilities. 
